Central bank communication and policy effectiveness by Michael Woodford
One of the most notable changes at the Federal Reserve during the
tenure of Alan Greenspan as chairman of the Board of Governors has
been a steady increase in the Federal Open Market Committee’s
(FOMC) willingness to talk openly about the policy decisions that it
has made and those it is likely to make in the future. Before the 1990s,
central banking was shrouded in mystery, at the Fed as elsewhere. The
title of William Greider’s 1987 bestseller about the Fed—Secrets of the
Temple—gives an idea of the common perception of the institution at
the beginning of the Greenspan era. This “mystique” of central
banking was guarded jealously by central bankers—as the epigraph
indicates—as essential to their success. 
Things have changed rapidly over the past 15 years at the Fed and
elsewhere. Indeed, St. Louis Fed President William Poole (2005) lists
the increase in transparency, and the consequent increase in the
predictability of monetary policy, as one of the four defining charac-
teristics of “the Greenspan policy regime.” Before 1994, the FOMC
made no public announcement regarding its target for the federal
funds rate following the meetings at which the target was determined.
Markets had to try and infer the target rate from the type and size of
open market operations, which were conducted subsequently by the
Trading Desk in New York to implement the policy. According to
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399Poole, “before Greenspan many within the Fed believed that policy
effectiveness depended on taking markets by surprise.” But since
February 1994, the FOMC has issued a public statement after each
meeting where the target rate has been changed, indicating the new
one. The FOMC also has been increasingly willing to give advance
signals of the likely future stance of policy. Beginning in December
1998, the FOMC began to include in the post-meeting statement an
assessment of its current “bias” with respect to possible changes in the
stance of policy. In December 1999, the committee decided from then
on it would issue a statement after every meeting, whether policy was
changed or not, and that this would include a “balance of risks” assess-
ment, which would refer to a time horizon extending beyond the next
committee meeting. Since August 2003—as is discussed further in the
“Communication about what” section of the paper—the post-
meeting statements have included even more explicit statements about
the likely future path of interest rates. This aspect of the statement now
attracts considerable attention, in financial markets and in the finan-
cial press. Most recently, the FOMC has moved to expedite the release
of the minutes of its deliberations, so that these now are available to
the public before the next committee meeting. This also has facilitated
public understanding of current policy, and it has helped to increase
the clarity with which the FOMC is able to explain its view of the
likely future path of policy. 
Poole argues that the “improved predictability of policy [under
Greenspan] has had much to do with improved effectiveness of
policy.” Is there reason to believe that this is true? And more specifi-
cally, does the Fed’s recent bold experiment in greater explicitness
about the future outlook for interest rates represent an innovation that
should be expected to enhance further the effectiveness of policy, or
does it represent a step too far?1
I shall begin by reviewing the general case for the importance of
effective communication for effective monetary policy, and then ask,
in the light of these general considerations, to what extent it makes
sense for a central bank to be willing to make public statements about
future policy. I then will discuss in further detail two specific contexts
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 in which central banks recently have given a great deal of attention to
the question of how much they should talk about the future path of
interest rates. The first is the Fed’s experiment with policy signaling
since August 2003, already mentioned. The second concerns the
assumption about future policy that should be used in projections of
the economy’s likely future evolution, which are made public. This
has been a particularly crucial issue for the inflation-forecast-targeting
central banks, for reasons discussed further in the third section of the
paper. But the issue also is being debated within the Federal Reserve
System, especially among those considering the possibility of infla-
tion targeting in the United States. 
Why communication matters
The importance of communication strategy for policy effectiveness
follows from a fundamental feature of the kind of problem that a
central bank is called upon to solve. Central banking is not like steer-
ing an oil tanker, or even guiding a spacecraft, which follows a
trajectory that depends on constantly changing factors, but does not
depend on the vehicle’s own expectations about where it is heading.
Because the key decisionmakers in an economy are forward-looking,
central banks affect the economy as much through their influence on
expectations as through any direct, mechanical effects of central bank
trading in the market for overnight cash. As a consequence, there is
good reason for a central bank to commit itself to a systematic
approach to policy that not only provides an explicit framework for
decisionmaking within the bank, but also is used to explain the bank’s
decisions to the public. 
Central banking as management of expectations
It is important for the public to understand the central bank’s actions,
to the greatest extent possible, not only for reasons of democratic legit-
imacy—though this is an excellent reason, given that central bankers
are granted substantial autonomy in the execution of their task—but
also in order for monetary policy to be most effective. Not only do
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 expectations about policy matter, but, at least under current condi-
tions, very little else matters. Few central banks of major industrial
nations still make much use of credit controls or other attempts to
directly regulate the flow of funds through financial markets and insti-
tutions. Increases in the sophistication of the financial system have
made it more difficult for such controls to be effective. And, in any
event, the goal of improving the efficiency of the sectoral allocation of
resources stressed above hardly would be served by such controls,
which (if successful) inevitably create inefficient distortions in the rela-
tive cost of funds to different parts of the economy. 
Instead, banks restrict themselves to interventions that seek to
control the overnight interest rate in an interbank market for central
bank balances (for example, the federal funds rate in the United
States). But the current level of overnight interest rates, as such, is of
negligible importance for economic decisionmaking. If a change in the
overnight rate were thought to imply only a change in the cost of
overnight borrowing for that one night, then even a large change (say,
a full percentage point increase) would make little difference to
anyone’s spending decisions. The effectiveness of changes in central
bank targets for overnight rates in affecting spending decisions (and,
hence, ultimately pricing and employment decisions) is wholly
dependent upon the impact of such actions upon other financial
market prices, such as longer-term interest rates, equity prices, and
exchange rates. These are plausibly linked, through arbitrage relations,
to the short-term interest rates most directly affected by central bank
actions. But it is the expected future path of short-term rates over
coming months and even years that should matter for the determina-
tion of these other asset prices, rather than the current level of
short-term rates by itself.2
Thus, the ability of central banks to influence expenditure, and hence
pricing, decisions is critically dependent upon their ability to influence
market expectations regarding the future pathof overnight interest rates,
and not merely their current level. Better information on the part of
market participants about central bank actions and intentions should
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 increase the degree to which central bank policy decisions actually can
affect these expectations and increase the effectiveness of monetary
stabilization policy. Insofar as the significance of current developments
for future policy are clear to the private sector, markets, to a large
extent, can “do the central bank’s work for it,” in that the actual changes
in overnight rates required to achieve the desired changes in incentives
can be much more modest when expected future rates move as well.3 
Thus, the public’s understanding, not only of what the central bank is
doing currently, but also of what it can be expected to do in the future,
is critical for the effectiveness of policy. It might, nonetheless, be argued
that it should be enough for a central bank to systematically follow a
sound policy, without also needing to explain it to the public. If one
assumes rational expectations on the part of the public, it would follow
that any systematic pattern in the way that policy is conducted should
be correctly inferred from the bank’s observed behavior. Yet while it
would be unwise to choose a policy that depends on its not being under-
stood by the public to succeed—which is the reason for choosing a
policy rule that is associated with a desirable rational-expectations equi-
librium—at the same time it is prudent not to rely too heavily on the
assumption that the public will understand policy perfectly regardless of
the efforts that are made to explain it. Insofar as explanation of the policy
rule to the public does no harm under the assumption of rational expec-
tations, but improves outcomes under the (more realistic) assumption
that a correct understanding of the central bank’s policy commitments
does not occur automatically, then it is clearly desirable for the central
bank to explain the rule that it follows.4
The advantages of a public target, when the private sector must
otherwise forecast future policy by extrapolating from experience, are
shown in a recent analysis by Orphanides and Williams (2005). In the
Orphanides-Williams model, private agents forecast inflation using a
linear regression model, the coefficients of which are constantly 
reestimated using the most recent observations of inflation. The
assumption of forecasting in this manner (on the basis of a finite time
window of historical observations) rather than a postulate of rational
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 expectations worsens the tradeoff between inflation variability and
output-gap variability that is available to the central bank.5 Allowing
inflation variations in response to “cost-push” shocks for the sake of
output-gap stabilization is more costly than it would be under rational
expectations because temporary inflation fluctuations in response to
the shocks can be misinterpreted as indicating different inflation
objectives on the part of the central bank. Orphanides and Williams
then show that a credible commitment to a long-run inflation
target—so that private agents do not need to estimate the long-run
average rate of inflation, but only the dynamics of transitory 
departures from it—allows substantially better stabilization outcomes,
though still not quite as good as if private agents were to fully
understand the equilibrium dynamics implied by the central bank’s
policy rule. This provides a nice example of theoretical support for the
interpretation given by Mervyn King (2005a) and others of practical
experience with inflation targeting, which is that tighter anchoring of
the public’s inflation expecations has made possible greater stability of
both real activity and inflation. 
Nor is there any reason to suppose that it suffices for a central bank to
make clear the long-run average inflation rate that it intends to main-
tain, while allowing the public to reach its own conclusions about the
nature of transitory departures of the inflation rate from that long-run
average. It is certainly true that anchoring expectations about the long-
run average inflation rate is important, and that in itself is an important
accomplishment. But the analysis of Orphanides and Williams also
shows that even when private agents know the long-run average, but
have to estimate the dynamics of transitory departures from it, the avail-
able tradeoff between inflation stabilization and output-gap stabilization
is less favorable than it would be under rational expectations (in other
words, than it would be if one could rely on a correct understanding of
the transitory dynamics). Thus, there are principle gains from an explicit
commitment regarding this aspect of policy as well, and not simply
trusting that people will be able to observe the pattern in one’s behavior.
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 There is also a further, somewhat subtler, reason why explicit
commitment to a target or policy rule is desirable, given the forward-
looking behavior of the people in the economy that one seeks to
stabilize. Even if one supposes that the private sector will understand
fully whatever approach to policy the central bank takes, regardless of
what it says about it, a public commitment to a rule can help policy-
makers conduct policy in a way that achieves better outcomes. For it
is not enough that a central bank have sound objectives (reflecting a
correct analysis of social welfare), that it make policy in a systematic
way, using a correct model of the economy and a staff that is well-
trained in numerical optimization, and that all this be explained
thoroughly to the public. A bank that approaches its problem as one
of optimization under discretion—deciding afresh on the best action in
each decision cycle, with no commitment regarding future actions
except that they will be the ones that seem best in whatever circum-
stances may arise—still can obtain a substantially worse outcome,
from the point of view of its own objectives, than one that commits
itself to follow a properly chosen policy rule. As Kydland and Prescott
(1977) first showed, this can occur even when the central bank has a
correct quantitative model of the policy tradeoffs that it faces at each
point in time, and the private sector has correct expectations about the
way that policy will be conducted. 
At first thought, discretionary optimization might seem exactly
what one would want an enlightened central bank to do. All sorts of
unexpected events constantly occur that affect the determination of
inflation and real activity, and it is not hard to see that, in general, the
optimal level of interest rates at any point in time should depend on
precisely what has occurred. It is plainly easiest, as a practical matter,
to arrange for such complex state dependence of policy by having the
instrument setting at a given point in time be determined only after
the unexpected shocks already have been observed. Furthermore, it
might seem that the dynamic programming approach to the solution
of intertemporal optimization problems provides justification for an
approach in which a planning problem is reduced to a series of inde-
pendent choices at each of a succession of decision dates. 
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 But standard dynamic programming methods are valid only for the
optimal control of a system that evolves mechanically in response to
the current action of the controller. The problem of monetary stabi-
lization policy is of a different sort, in that the consequences of the
central bank’s actions depend not only upon the sequence of instru-
ment settings up until the present time, but also upon private-sector
expectations regarding future policy. In such a case, sequential (discre-
tionary) optimization leads to a suboptimal outcome because at each
decision point, prior expectations are taken as given, rather than as
something that can be affected by policy. Nonetheless, the predictable
character of the central bank’s decisions, taken from this point of
view, does determine the (endogenous) expectations of the private
sector at earlier dates, under the hypothesis of rational expectations.
A commitment to behave differently, that is made credible to the
private sector, could shape those expectations in a different way. And
because expectations matter for the determination of the variables
that the central bank cares about, in general, outcomes can be
improved through shrewd use of this opportunity. This is illustrated
concretely in the second section of the paper, when I discuss the way
in which policy should be conducted when the lower bound on
short-term nominal interest rates constrains the way that policy can
be conducted. 
In general, the most effective policy (the best outcome, from among
the set of possible rational-expectations equilibria) requires that policy
be conducted in a history-dependent way, so that policy at any time
depends not only on conditions then (and what it is considered possi-
ble to achieve from then on), but also on past conditions, even though
these no longer constrain what it is possible to achieve in the present.
While there is no benefit, at the time, from conducting policy in a way
that is conditioned by the past, the anticipation that one would do so,
at an earlier date, can have beneficial effects on what policy can achieve
at the earlier date. These benefits can make the subsequent losses
worthwhile, as the example in the next section shows. 
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 It is, furthermore, desirable not simply that a central bank have a
private intention of this sort, but that it be publicly committed to such
a target. First, a public commitment is likely to make it easier for the
central bank’s policy deliberations to remain focused on the right crite-
rion—the one with the property that systematic conformity to it leads
to an optimal equilibrium—rather than being tempted to “let bygones
be bygones.” And, second, the benefits associated with commitment to
a history-dependent policy depend entirely on this aspect of policy
being anticipated by the private sector, otherwise, it would be rational
to “let bygones be bygones.” There is no point to a secret commitment
to the future conduct of policy in accordance with a history-dependent
rule, while the private sector continues to believe that the central bank
will act in a purely forward-looking fashion, thus, the target should be
explained as clearly as possible to the public, and shown to be guiding
the bank’s decisions. 
Communication about what?
Which specific types of communication by central banks are most
important, in light of the objectives discussed above? It is possible to
distinguish among at least four broad classes of issues, about which a
central bank may consider revealing more or less to the public. The
first is the central bank’s interpretation of economic conditions, includ-
ing (perhaps) the central bank’s view of the outlook for the future, to
the extent that this is shaped by factors other than the bank’s inten-
tions with regard to policy. Central banks typically have large staffs
devoted to collecting and analyzing information about current condi-
tions in the economy, as an input into policy deliberations; and the
accuracy of private-sector understanding of the state of the economy
might be improved if the central bank were to reveal more about what
it believes it has learned. A second topic is the content of the policy
decisions that are made in the central bank about current operating
targets. For example, as noted in the introduction of the paper, the Fed
did not publicly confirm the existence of an operating target for the
federal funds rate prior to 1994, whereas current practice is to release
a statement immediately following each meeting of the FOMC,
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 which, among other things, announces the operating target agreed
upon at that meeting. A third possible kind of communication would
be a description (which might be more or less explicit) of the strategy
that guides the central bank’s policy decisions in general. A fourth type
of communication, much debated in the United States at present,
makes statements about the outlook for future policy, in light of the
current situation, without necessarily asserting that this illustrates a
general rule that always will be followed. 
These are all types of communication in which the public might be
interested, and a general commitment to increased “transparency”
might be taken to require greater explicitness about all of these
matters. But the way in which “transparency” about one or another of
these matters relates to the goal of more effective stabilization policy is
somewhat different in each case. The first two types of communica-
tion are the ones that are least controversial among central bankers;6
to the extent that there are doubts about the desirability of saying more
about the central bank’s analysis of current conditions, for example,
this is largely connected to the way that the public may use this infor-
mation to make inferences (rightly or wrongly) about the bank’s
intentions regarding future policy. And it is, in any event, the effect of
central bank talk on the public’s expectations regarding future policy
that is critical for the concerns introduced above. Hence, it is commu-
nication about the way in which policy should be conducted in the
future (the third and fourth types of communication listed above)
about which I wish to speak here. 
One might, first of all, make statements about the targets or objec-
tives that future policy decisions will aim to achieve; ideally, one
might imagine a full description of a policy rule to which the policy
committee intends to conform. This is the ideal suggested by the
theoretical literature, on the basis of the considerations summarized
above. On the one hand, private-sector decisions depend, in princi-
ple, not just on near-term expectations, but on the expected
state-contingent evolution of the economy far into the future, and
not just on what is most likely to happen, but on how the economy
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 will evolve under all possible future contingencies. And one only
could hope to communicate about what should happen in all of the
relevant future states through a discussion of the bank’s general strat-
egy. Moreover, an optimal policy requires that the central bank
commit itself to behave in a different way than would correspond to
discretionary optimization. It is difficult to imagine institutionalizing
such conduct other than through a conscious commitment to a
particular strategy inside the central bank itself. And if such a
conscious intention exists, a public statement of the commitment is
likely to help the policy committee to remember its intention. 
But what does any of this have to do with communication policy?
The public commitment of a central bank to particular targets or to a
particular policy rule will not be matters for routine, ongoing commu-
nication with the public that requires institutionalization. It is true that
from time to time it will be appropriate to change the targets—as, for
example, in the case of the change in the United Kingdom announced
in December 2003, from a RPIX target of 2.5 percent per annum to a
CPI target of 2 percent—but announcements of this kind are not what
is generally understood by “communication policy.” Would communi-
cation policy be important, then, for a central bank that actually was
able to commit itself to a sensible policy strategy? 
There are two reasons why it surely would be. The first is the need for
verifiability of the central bank’s commitment. One might imagine that
the central bank’s seriousness about its declared targets could be ensured
by checking whether they are met, without requiring the bank to say
anything about how it ensures that they are met. For example, under a
rumor that was widespread at one time, accountability was ensured in
New Zealand by a “contract” with the governor of the Reserve Bank of
New Zealand (RBNZ) according to which the governor could be fired
if realized inflation ever went outside a certain band. In practice,
however, it makes more sense to monitor the existence of good faith
efforts to achieve the bank’s targets than to suppose that one can
demand that the targets actually will be fulfilled at all times; and this
will require communication by the central bank about the rationale for
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 its policy decisions. Moreover, to the extent that optimal target criteria
involve the expected paths of variables that cannot yet be directly meas-
ured, as is typically the case, it is appropriate to check, not whether the
actually realized values satisfy the target criterion, but whether it would
have been reasonable for the central bank to expect them to satisfy the
criterion at the time of its policy decision. This requires the central
bank to discuss the projections on the basis of which the policy 
decision was made. 
The second reason is that in practice, the strategy that a sensible
central bank follows (and may wish to be understood to follow) will
be too complex to explain through any one-time, official statement of
its “policy rule.” On the one hand, the set of contingencies that may
arise (and matter substantially for policy if they do) are extremely
various. As a consequence, an explicit rule of conduct (one specific
enough to indicate unambiguously the instrument setting appropriate
to any given circumstances) would either contain too many provisos
to actually be written down, or would deal in a grossly inadequate way
with the situations actually encountered with some frequency.7 More-
over, as Bank of England Gov. Mervyn King (2005b) has stressed in
his recent Mais Lecture, the central bank’s understanding of the mone-
tary transmission mechanism surely will continue to evolve, but this
means an explicit rule that was judged to be optimal on the basis of
the bank’s preferred model of the economy in one year would surely
no longer be judged optimal from the point of view of the bank’s best
understanding a few years later.8
These considerations sometimes are taken to imply that the very
idea of advance commitment to a policy strategy is impractical, and
that the only sound approach will be something close to pure discre-
tion. I do not believe so, nor is that the point of Gov. King’s
discussion. What they do imply, however, is that in practice, the kind
of commitment that it is sensible for a central bank to make in
advance and is sensible for it to try to explain to the public, is a
commitment to a general strategy, with the implications of this strat-
egy for the precise instrument settings that will be appropriate under
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 particular circumstances left to be determined when it is known which
circumstances have arisen. Similarly, the general strategy should be one
to which the bank can expect to adhere even as its views about the
details of the monetary transmission mechanism change, though its
current best guess about those details will play an important role in
deliberations about the particular actions that will best implement the
general strategy. 
The general strategy to which the bank commits itself nonetheless
can and should be more specific than a mere promise to do “whatever
best serves social welfare” in whatever circumstances have arisen, and
it should require a different approach to policy than the one that
would be chosen by a discretionary optimizer. For example, it should
bring about a lower average rate of inflation than would result
(according to most plausible economic models) from discretionary
optimization, and it should require departures of the inflation rate
from that long-run average to be less persistent on average than would
most likely result from discretionary optimization as well.9 And in
order for the benefits of these aspects of the bank’s strategy to be
obtained, the consequences of this commitment for the economy’s
likely future evolution must be made clear to the public, at least to
the extent that this is possible given the uncertainty faced by the
central bank itself. 
Because the way in which the strategy will be implemented in 
practice cannot be reduced to an explicit instrument rule, ongoing
communication on the part of the central bank can play an important
role in clarifying the consequences of the general strategy. It can be very
useful to illustrate the consequences of the bank’s approach to policy
deliberations by showing how the particular situations that already have
arisen were analyzed. Over time, the observation of a sufficient number
of such cases should help the private sector to some degree of under-
standing of the central bank’s “reaction function.” (The chances of this
occurring, of course, are vastly greater in the case that the bank does
seek to base its decisions on a stable set of principles, despite the varying
kinds of information that are considered on different occasions, and in
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 the case that it explains its decisions each time by reference to those
same principles.) But this approach to making public the systematic
character of policy will depend on a commitment to frequent commu-
nication about ongoing policy deliberations within the bank. Ideally,
such communication will be regular, detailed, and structured, as in the
case of the Inflation Reports of the inflation-forecast- targeting central
banks (discussed further in the third section). 
A somewhat different way in which central bank talk can convey
information about future policy is through direct statements about
the current outlook for policy. Such statements—illustrated by the
comments that recently have been included in the post-meeting state-
ments of the FOMC in the United States (discussed further in the
second section)—fall considerably short of stating a general rule for
the conduct of policy, and are likely to refer only to future policy over
a fairly short horizon. They can, however, be much more specific
about matters such as how the policy instrument will be set than
descriptions of the bank’s general strategy are likely to be. 
There are a number of reasons why this kind of communication also
can be useful. First of all, it might be used to some extent as a substitute
for communication about a general strategy for those central banks that
are reluctant to commit themselves to any target or strategy in general,
but nonetheless may be willing to commit themselves occasionally to
an ad hoc departure from fully discretionary policy. In fact, communi-
cation of this kind has been used most notably thus far by central banks
such as the U.S. Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan,10 which have
not been willing to explicit themselves to quantitative inflation targets. 
But discussion of the outlook for policy is likely to play a useful role
even in the case of a bank that is as explicit about its general commit-
ments as it is likely to be possible for any bank to be. As just discussed,
in practice, it would not be possible for a bank to commit itself to an
explicit instrument rule. Thus, there would be considerable room to
give further information about the likely path of the policy instrument
on particular occasions that would neither contradict nor be made
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 unnecessary by the bank’s commitment to its general strategy. Such
communication would help to flesh out the concrete implications of
the general strategy and increase the ability of the private sector to make
correct inferences about the consequences of the bank’s commitments
for the future evolution of the economy. This kind of amplification of
the general strategy is likely to be especially useful when unusual
circumstances arise, so that the implications of the strategy for circum-
stances of that kind might not be at all apparent simply from
observation of the bank’s past behavior. The situation discussed in the
next section—where the Federal Reserve found itself at least poten-
tially constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates,
though this constraint had been irrelevant for more than 50 years—
provides a good example of such an occasion. 
A further argument for the desirability of communication about the
outlook for future policy—and one in no way tied to unusual circum-
stances—follows from the history dependence of an optimal policy
commitment. Optimal policy requires not only that the central bank
commit itself to a particular rule of conduct, but that the rule be
history-dependent. It must take account of past conditions, even
some that no longer matter for an evaluation of what it would be
possible to achieve from now on. Hence, any institutionalization of
an optimal rule must involve keeping some record of past conditions.
It, furthermore, is worth noting that what matters is not what the past
was actually like (as viewed from the future, when the history-
dependent policy action is to be taken), but how matters appeared
then, as this is what would determine the value at the earlier time of
being able to shift expectations regarding future policy.11Thus, imple-
mentation of an optimal policy requires that a record be kept of how
matters appeared to the policy committee in the past and that those
past views condition the later policy decision. And while history-
dependent policy requires only that there exist an internal record, the
benefits of history dependence depend on its being understood by the
public. This makes a public statement about the aspects of the current
situation that should change future policy deliberations appropriate. 
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 There are various ways in which the relevant aspects of past delib-
erations might be encoded and in which those records might be used
in subsequent deliberations. But one fairly straightforward one—
which would make it especially easy for the public to understand the
consequences for future policy—would be to indicate at the earlier
date the future policy that should be expected to be implemented
later, in the absence of developments unforeseen at that time. The
policy committee would then be committed to actually implement
the policy announced earlier, unless circumstances changed in ways
not foreseen previously. Deciding policy in advance (to this extent)
would be an obvious way of allowing the policy committee to inter-
nalize the effects of anticipations of its later policy, and making public
the committee’s forecast of future policy would be an obvious way of
making clear the expectations regarding future policy that should
follow from the intention to make policy history-dependent. Of
course, in order to prevent such an advance commitment from imply-
ing a non-state-contingent (and hence suboptimal) rule of conduct,
it would be important to specify the assumptions regarding economic
developments under which the forecast about future policy had been
made, so that the nature of the contingency of the commitment
would be clear. 
Can a central bank talk too much?
There are, nonetheless, a number of questions that may be raised
about the desirability of central bank communication, especially in
the case of communication about future policy intentions. One point
of view—once fairly common among central bankers, though less
common now—would question whether it is actually desirable to
increase the degree of precision with which the markets are able to
anticipate the actions of the central bank, arguing that market inter-
ventions by the central bank will be more effective to the extent that
the bank is able to surprise the markets. The idea, essentially, is that
unanticipated trading by the central bank should move market rates
by more, owing to the imperfect liquidity of the markets. Instead, if
traders are widely able to anticipate the central bank’s trades in
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 advance, a larger number of counterparties should be available to
trade with the bank, so that a smaller change in the market price will
be required in order for the market to absorb a given change in the
supply of a particular instrument. 
But such an analysis assumes that the central bank achieves its
objectives better by being able to move market yields more, even if it
does so by exploiting temporary illiquidity of the markets. Yet the
temporarily greater movement in market prices that is so obtained—
if any greater movement is obtained12—occurs only because these
prices are temporarily less well-coupled to decisions being made
outside the financial markets. Hence, it is not at all obvious that any
actual increase in the effect of the central bank’s action upon the
economy—upon the things that are actually relevant to the bank’s
stabilization goals—can be purchased in this way.13 
Another ground for caution about the amount that the central bank
should say about its view of the future is provided by the analysis of
Morris and Shin (2002) of the possible disadvantages of public infor-
mation provision. Morris and Shin consider a stylized game in which
individual market participants choose an action on the basis of their
observation of both a public signal (common knowledge to all market
participants) and a private signal. Both the public signal and the
private signal are noisy measures of some payoff-relevant “fundamen-
tal” state variable. Each market participant is assumed to care both
about choosing an action that is appropriate given the fundamental
state of the economy and about choosing an action that is not too
different from others’ actions. (The latter aspect of the assumed
payoffs in the game gives it some of the characteristics of Keynes’
famous “beauty contest.”) Morris and Shin show that while an
increase in the precision of the private information available to market
participants necessarily increases social welfare, an increase in the
precision of the public signal has an ambiguous effect on welfare. On
the one hand, it will increase the accuracy of each market participant’s
assessment of the current state of the economy, with the result that
equilibrium actions are, on average, more appropriate to current
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 fundamentals. But, on the other hand, it will reduce the weight that
each market participant puts on her private information in forming her
estimate of current conditions and, hence, in choosing her action, and
increase the weight placed on the public signal instead. This second
effect makes the average action less appropriate to the current state
because the error in the public signal affects everyone’s action (while the
errors in participants’ private signals instead cancel out and have no
effect on the average action). It is possible for the second effect to
outweigh the first, so that welfare is reduced by an increase in the preci-
sion of the public signal—that is, by an increase in the amount of
information conveyed by it.14
Morris and Shin stress that a leading application of their analysis
should be to question whether increased transparency on the part of
a central bank is necessarily a good thing,15 and their argument has
received a great deal of attention in central banks and in the financial
press,16 often in the context of discussions of the desirability of the
kind of signaling of future policy described in the second section of
this paper. However, the applicability of their analysis to this kind of
central bank communication is far from obvious. 
It is important to recognize that while Morris and Shin show that a
(small) increase in the precision of the information released by a public
authority can be welfare-reducing under some circumstances, the
conditions under which this result is obtained are quite special. First
of all, the perverse outcome requires that the central bank’s announce-
ment not be too accurate as an indicator of the “fundamental” in
question, while market participants’ private information about that
same state variable must be sufficiently precise. In fact, as Svensson
(2005) points out, in the Morris-Shin model, the precision of each
participant’s private information must be at least eight times as great as
the precision of the public signal in order for the perverse outcome to
be possible.17 And it is not obvious that private information should be
so much superior to the information that would be revealed by a
central bank that makes an effort to tell what it knows. 
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 Of course, central banks are themselves less than omniscient, and
one argument within central banks for limiting the amount that is said
to the public is the straightforward observation that the central bank
does not know the answers to all of the questions about which market
participants would wish to be informed. But the Morris-Shin result
requires not only that the central bank’s assessment of the fundamen-
tal, should it choose to reveal it, would not be God’s truth; it requires
that it be much less accurate on average than the estimate that any
market participant would make on her own, in the absence of
comment by the central bank. Even in the case of an assessment of
economic conditions that are largely outside the control of the central
bank, it is not plausible that a central bank’s guess should be this bad.
For example, Romer and Romer (2000) find that Federal Reserve
Board staff forecasts compare favorably with the accuracy of even the
most sophisticated private forecasters’ forecasts, and this is hardly
surprising given the size of the Fed staff and its privileged access to
certain kinds of information.
And the assumption about relative accuracy required for a perverse
result is least plausible of all in the case of central bank communica-
tion about likely future policy. If there is one issue about which a
central bank should have better information than that of market
participants, it is the bank’s own deliberations about matters (such as
the path of the federal funds rate) that are essentially under its direct
control.18 Again, it often is objected that even if the federal funds
rate is completely subject to a decision by the FOMC, this does not
mean that the FOMC already knows what it will decide about where
it will want the funds rate to be next year. It is suggested that an inac-
curate forecast may be worse than none at all. But even if the
committee does not yet know the precise answer to questions, such
as when the current series of quarter-point increases in the funds rate
target will end, it surely is in a better position than outsiders to make
an informed guess. It is, therefore, implausible that a public revela-
tion of its best guess about this matter could reduce welfare on the
grounds proposed by Morris and Shin. 
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 A second requirement for the perverse result in the Morris-Shin
model is that the game played by market participants must have
elements of a “beauty contest.” Market participants must care, not just
about acting in a way that conforms as much as possible with current
fundamentals, but also about acting similarly to the way that others
do. They must care sufficiently strongly about conformity relative to
their concern with fundamentals. Specifically, Morris and Shin assume
a game in which each player i wishes to minimize the expected value
of a loss function 
Li ≡ (1−r)(ai −θ)2 +rEj(aj−ai) 2, (1.1)
where aj is the action of a generic player j, θ is the unknown value of
the “fundamental” state, Ej denotes an average over the continuum
of players indexed by j, and 0<r<1 is the relative weight on the
conformity objective. The possibility of a perverse result requires not
only the presence of the second term in the loss function, but also
that r >1⁄2,so that the weight on the second term is greater than the
weight on the first. If r ≤ 1⁄2,then an increase in the precision of the
public signal raises welfare regardless of what one may assume about
the relative precisions of the public and private signals. 
But, again, it is not obvious that one should assume that this is the
relevant case where signals regarding the future path of interest rates are
concerned. Is it really true that, holding constant a bond trader’s esti-
mate of the “fundamental” value of a bond (based on both the central
bank’s hints about the future path of interest rates and his own infor-
mation), the fact that other traders currently wish to buy the bond
would make him wish to buy more of it? Might the second piece of
information make him think it is a good time to sell the bond that is
overvalued on average, perhaps because average opinion has been influ-
enced by views of the central bank that he disagrees with? If so, then
the game among market participants would be characterized by “strate-
gic substitutability” rather than “strategic complementarity.” And as
Morris and Shin note in their article, the informational-externality
argument instead would imply that market participants will put less
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 weight on the public signal than would be socially optimal, rather than
paying too much attention to the central bank’s announcements. 
Finally, the perverse result is possible in the model of Morris and
Shin only because of a particular assumption about the proper
measure of social welfare that, in fact, is highly debatable. Recall that
individual market participants are assumed to care about two distinct
objectives—acting in a way that is appropriate given the fundamental
state and acting in the same way that others act—represented by the
two terms in the loss function (1.1). But Morris and Shin rank alter-
native equilibria using a welfare criterion that reflects only one of these
private objectives. They assume that public policy should seek to mini-
mize a social loss function 
L
soc, MS≡ Ei [(ai – θ)2], (1.2)
the average squared distance of individual actions from the one that
would be appropriate given the fundamental state θ. While individu-
als are assumed to dislike taking an action that differs from the
actions taken by others, there is assumed to be no social welfare
consequence of less coordination across the actions taken by different
market participants. 
It is not obvious, however, that this makes sense. The same factors
that make individuals seek to avoid actions that are too far out of line
with the actions of others may well imply that there are social losses
from such lack of coordination. And the simplifying assumption
made in the example of Morris and Shin is not innocuous. For the
factor they omit from their consideration of social welfare is one that
necessarily favors greater precision of the public signal. An increase in
the precision of the public signal necessarily will reduce the dispersion
of individual market participants’ actions, exactly because it leads
them to put less weight on their private information, which is the
source of dispersion. 
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 I show in the Appendix that if one were instead to rank outcomes
on the basis of a social loss function proportional to Ei[Li]—that is,
by the population average of the individual loss function (1.1)—then
this alternative social loss function necessarily is reduced by increasing
the precision of the public signal, even though the Morris-Shin loss
function L
soc, MS may be increased. As noted above, the only case in
which (1.1) can be increased is when r is large, but this is exactly the
case in which the goal of reducing the dispersion of opinion becomes
the more important factor for social welfare, under the alternative
proposed here. Since the objective proposed here seems the more
reasonable one, I find little reason to be troubled by the Morris-Shin
example, even when one grants the parametric assumptions required
for their perverse case.19
Of course, central bankers may have other reasons to be concerned
about saying too much about matters about which they are themselves
uncertain. One of the reasons most often cited is a concern that
members of the public could be harmed by reliance on bad information
supplied by the central bank. But this would not be a concern if the
central bank’s audience could be assumed to consist of rational maximiz-
ers who optimally use the information available to them, as in the model
of Morris and Shin.20 And even granting that not all market participants
can be relied upon to be quite this sophisticated in the way that they
respond to news, it is not obvious that one should expect them to make
fewer mistakes if left to puzzle things out for themselves. The fact that
people are not ideal information processors means that a central bank
should give thought to the question of what market participants most
need to know and how best to express what it is trying to tell them.
Thus, it needs to have a communication strategy, and not simply a
concern for “transparency” in the sense of letting anyone see whatever
they wish. But it is not a reason for central banks not to try to increase
the amount that is effectively communicated. 
I do not wish to minimize the difficulties associated with effective
communication with the public, especially about matters as subtle as
the likely conduct of policy under future circumstances that are not yet
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 known. In practice, communication strategies improve only through a
process of trial and error, even when central banks give considerable
attention to the problem of how to tell the public more. Market
participants must learn to interpret what the central bank is saying,
and the central bank must learn to anticipate how its statements will
be interpreted. The remaining sections of this paper consider two
recent case studies in which central banks have grappled with the 
question of how to talk about the outlook for future monetary policy. 
Signaling future policy near the interest rate lower bound
A case in which the benefits of being able to steer expectations
regarding the future conduct of policy, other than through current
policy actions alone, are especially clear is the case in which overnight
interest rates are already as low as it is possible or desirable to make
them, while underutilization of productive capacity and/or unduly
low inflation continue to suggest a need for further monetary stimu-
lus. Japan, where the overnight rate (call rate) has been at zero almost
continuously since 1999, despite continued deflation, provides an
obvious example of the possibility of such a situation. But the United
States faced a similar situation, or at least the risk of one, in the spring
and summer of 2003, as the federal funds rate operating target was
reduced to only 1 percent, while the strength of the recovery
remained doubtful and inflation remained lower than the Fed was
entirely comfortable with. 
Does monetary policy become impotent when the zero lower bound
is reached, as classic analyses of the possibility of a “liquidity trap” in
static models would suggest? Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show
that the answer is yes, in the context of an explicit general-equilibrium
model of the transactions demand for money with sticky prices, if
monetary policy is understood to consist solely of various ways in
which the monetary base might be expanded through current open
market operations, without any change in the way in which monetary
policy is expected to be conducted in the future.21 But they also show
that changes in the expected conduct of monetary policy in the
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 future—after real conditions change, so the policy that would be
preferred at the time, but for the need to fulfill earlier commitments,
would be one in which nominal interest rates would be well above
zero—can have a very substantial effect on inflation and real activity
during the period in which the zero bound is a binding constraint.
This indicates the possibility of substantial benefits from signaling that
future policy will be conducted in a different way than might other-
wise have been expected, simply as a result of the economy’s having
been temporarily constrained by the interest rate lower bound. 
An optimal policy commitment when the lower bound binds
It is worth recapitulating some of the details of the analysis of optimal
policy by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), as a basis for discussion of
the recent use of communications policy in both the United States and
Japan. The exposition is simplest if we proceed directly to a log linear
approximation to their intertemporal equilibrium model with Calvo-
style staggered price setting. In this approximation (which, except for
the imposition of the zero bound, is identical to the one used in studies
such as Clarida and others, 1999), inflation πt and the output gap xt
are determined by a pair of equations each period,22 
πt = Kxt + βEt πt+1, (2.1)
xt = Etxt+1–σ[it – Et πt+1–rn
t ], (2.2)
where  K, σ are positive coefficients, and 0<β<1 is the utility
discount factor, it is the riskless short-term (one-period) nominal
interest rate, and rn
t is the natural (real) rate of interest that evolves
exogenously as a result of real disturbances. The interest rate it is
assumed to be the instrument of monetary policy and is here treated
as under the direct control of the central bank. We then may suppress
the equations of the model involving the demand for base money.
However, it is important to note that the interest rate will satisfy 
it  ≥ 0 (2.3)
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 no matter how much base money is supplied; this lower bound is the
constraint on policy with which we are here concerned. 
Let us suppose that the objective of policy is to minimize a discounted
loss function of the form 




with some weight λ > 0. It follows from equations (2.1) – (2.2) that as
long as rn
t ≥ 0 at all times, one possible rational-expectations equilib-
rium is one in which inflation and the output gap are both zero at all
times, and in such a case, this is obviously the equilibrium that mini-
mizes the loss function (2.4), and so, is optimal. But it is possible for
real disturbances to cause the natural rate of interest to be temporarily
negative.23 In such a case, the zero-inflation equilibrium is no longer a
possibility. (Note that this equilibrium requires that it = r n
t at all times,
so that (2.3) is satisfied only if r n
t ≥ 0 at all times.) 
Given that the pursuit of zero inflation at all times would be
optimal in the event that the lower bound on interest rates was never
a problem, one might suppose that even given the possibility of an
occasionally binding lower bound, it would be optimal to pursue zero
inflation at all times if the interest rate lower bound allows it. But this
is not true. As an illustration, consider the particular kind of real distur-
bance analyzed in the numerical example of Eggertsson and Woodford.
The “normal” (long-run average) level for the natural rate of interest is
r – ≡ β–1 –1 > 0. However, at some date, an unexpected disturbance
temporarily lowers the natural rate to a level r < 0. There is then a
probability 0 < p < 1 each period that “fundamentals” revert to their
normal state, so that rt
n = r – again, and, in this case, the natural rate of
interest is expected to equal r – indefinitely (there are no further distur-
bances). With probability 1–p, instead, the low-natural-rate state will
continue in the following period, conditional on the natural rate
remaining at r in the current period. 
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Σ
∞
t=0In this case, under the hypothesized policy, the central bank will
achieve zero inflation from period T onward, where T is the random
date at which fundamentals revert to their normal state. This will be
associated with a constant output gap of zero and a constant nominal
interest rate equal to r – > 0. Prior to this date, inflation will equal the
same rate π each period, the output gap will equal the same value x,
and the nominal interest rate will equal the same value i,24 where
these constant values satisfy 
π = κx + β(1–p)π, (2.5)
x = (1–p)x + σ[r + (1–p)π – i], (2.6)
as a result of equations (2.1) – (2.2), together with the requirements that 
π ≤ 0,           i ≥ 0, (2.7)
and that at least one of the inequalities in (2.7) must hold with equal-
ity. (The central bank achieves the zero inflation target at dates prior
to T, unless the zero bound prevents the inflation rate from being
raised to zero.) 
An equilibrium of this form exists as long as 
(1–p) (β + κσ
p )<1, (2.8)
in other words, as long as the degree of persistence of the disturbance
is not too great. One can easily show that under the assumption that
r < 0, it is the lower bound on interest rates that is binding in (2.7),
and the solution is given by 
π = <  0, x =  π < 0, (2.9)
together with i = 0. Thus, deflation and output below the natural rate
continue for as long as the disturbance to fundamentals does. Even if
prices are revised fairly often on average, the binding lower bound on
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(κσ)−1p [1 − β(1−p)] – (1–p)
1– β(1−p) r
κinterest rates can result in a slump that lasts for years. Furthermore,
(2.9) implies that even a very mildly negative value for the natural
rate of interest can result in very severe deflation and contraction of
real activity. Note that if the left-hand side of (2.8) is close enough to
1 (and there is no reason why it may not be), the rate of deflation and
the size of the negative output gap in (2.9) become arbitrarily large,
regardless of the degree to which r is less than zero.25
The contractionary effects may be quite large because of a chain of
circular causation. A real interest rate above the natural rate (owing
to the zero bound) causes a negative output gap and deflation prior
to period T. The anticipation of these effects, in the contingency
that the natural rate continues to be negative in the following period,
then depresses demand further and creates even stronger deflation in
any period prior to T, owing to the effects of expectations 
Et πt+1 <0,Etxt+1 < 0 in equations (2.1) – (2.2). The anticipation of
these even stronger deflationary and contractionary effects causes
still greater deflation and contraction, and so on in a cumulative
process that does not even converge unless (2.8) holds. 
It is crucial in the above reasoning that the central bank is expected
to target zero inflation again as soon as this becomes possible. While
this in fact would make sense ex post—and so would be the outcome
in a Markov equilibrium with discretionary optimization by the
central bank—a better outcome is possible if the central bank
commits to behave otherwise once fundamentals revert to their
normal state. This can be seen if we repeat the above calculations, but
assume that the central bank will bring about an inflation rate π − > 0
(and an associated output gap x – > 0) in period T. Under this varia-
tion on our assumptions, the solution for π in (2.9) generalizes to26
π = π − + , (2.10)
where x ss (π −) ≡ (1–β)κ–1π − is the steady-state output gap associated
with the steady-state inflation rate π −. 
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r + π − +pσ–1[x ––xss(π −)]
(κσ)−1p[1–β(1−p)] – (1–p)In the case that x – is increased along with π − to the extent that it
would in the case of a permanent commitment to the inflation target
π −, the multiplier effect of an increase in the long-run inflation target
π − on the inflation rate π − during the “liquidity trap” is given by 
where µ > 0 is the (possibly very large) multiplier – ∂π/∂r implied by
equation (2.9). There is a correspondingly large effect of a commitment
to target an inflation rate π − > 0 on the value of x as well. Thus, a
commitment to a future inflationary policy can mitigate the effects of
the zero lower bound, as argued by Krugman (1998). In the forward-
looking model of inflation and output determination used here, these
effects are quite large, owing to the same chain of circular causation as
above, but now operating in the opposite direction (a “virtuous circle”). 
However, the optimal policy commitment, in order to minimize
(2.4), is not a simple commitment to a higher long-run inflation
target. The effects just discussed on inflation and output while the
zero lower bound binds depend only on π − and x – being delivered in
period T, the first period in which the natural rate of interest is again
positive. There is no need to commit to continued inflation forever,
and this instead will lead to unnecessary distortions in the long run.
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show that the optimal policy
involves a commitment to the creation of a modest inflationary boom
in period T, and then stabilizing the price level shortly thereafter (in
other words, returning to a long-run inflation rate of zero) at a level
slightly higher than the one that would have been reached in the
absence of the disturbance.27
This is illustrated in Chart 1, which shows the paths of the nominal
interest rate, the inflation rate, and the output gap under the optimal
state-contingent policy commitment (for particular numerical
parameter values discussed by Eggertsson and Woodford), in the case
that T is exactly 15 quarters after the onset of the real disturbance.




= 1+µ,commitment to zero inflation (or discretionary optimization). While
the creation of the inflationary boom (by keeping interest rates low
for five more quarters, rather than immediately raising them to the
level that would be required to achieve price stability immediately at
date T ) results in mild distortions after date T. These are only tempo-
rary (as price stability and a zero output gap are achieved fairly soon)
and are quite mild relative to the size of the distortions prior to date
T that are thereby avoided. The strong effect of the commitment to
subsequent reflation of the economy occurs because of the chain of
circular causation just discussed.28
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Chart 1
Comparison of State-Contingent Paths Under Two Alternative
Monetary Policies, in the Case that the Natural Rate of Interest
is Negative for 15 Quarters.
Source: Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) 

































π*=0This numerical example illustrates several points of more general
importance. First, it shows how a credible commitment regarding the
future conduct of policy can, at least in principle, greatly expand a
central bank’s ability to achieve its stabilization objectives. But, in
addition, it shows that an optimal commitment requires not only that
the central bank pledge to behave in a different way than would a
discretionary optimizer; the conduct of policy also must be history-
dependent. For the inflation rate that should be targeted once the
natural rate of interest is positive is not the one that the central bank
always targets in the case of fundamentals of that kind. Rather, the
central bank temporarily should behave differently because of what
the economy’s situation has been in the recent past, even though those
circumstances no longer affect what it would be possible for policy to
achieve from now on. As I have discussed above, this history depend-
ence of the optimal policy commitment strengthens the case for
explicit discussion by the central bank of the way in which current
conditions change the outlook for future policy. If it were desired
simply to always target an inflation rate π − > 0, then it might not be
necessary for the central bank to talk about this while in the liquidity
trap. One might suppose that the central bank’s long-run inflation
target already would have been learned by the private sector from its
previous behavior and that people might expect confidently the
central bank to return to the pursuit of this target once circumstances
allowed it to be achieved, without any need for comment to that
effect. But if it is desired that the public understand, while policy is
constrained by the zero bound, that future policy will be different
from what it usually is under similar circumstances, because of the
current difficulties, then it is reasonable to suppose that the central
bank may need to discuss this, rather than expecting this to be
obvious from past experience. The case will be even stronger if the
circumstances under which the zero bound becomes a constraint are
fairly unusual. 
It also is worth noting that the advantages of commitment to a
history-dependent future policy do not depend on reaching the zero
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 bound. It simply is important that there be some lower bound on the
level of short-term nominal interest rates that the central bank is
willing to target. None of the analysis just sketched depends on there
being satiation in money balances when this bound is reached. In the
analysis of Eggertsson and Woodford, there is no need for history-
dependent policy unless there is some state in which the zero bound
binds. But that is because they assume there is no other obstacle to
lowering interest rates. If (as was arguably the case for the Fed in
2003) there is a positive level of interest rates iι, below which the
central bank does not wish to go, a similar analysis applies in the case
of this lower bound, except that now history-dependent policy
becomes valuable if the natural rate of interest ever drops below iι,
which is even more likely to occur if iι is positive.29 Regardless of
where the lower bound lies, a commitment to lower interest rates later
can substitute, at least partially, for being able to lower interest rates
immediately, so that history-dependent policy can relax the constraint
implied by the lower bound. 
Policy signaling in practice
The situation faced by the U.S. Federal Reserve in the summer of
2003 was arguably of the sort contemplated in the above analysis
(though the model used in the calculations is obviously an extreme
oversimplification). The federal funds rate operating target had been
reduced to 1 percent by June of that year, and (at least according to
speculation in financial markets and in the press) the FOMC may
have been reluctant to move lower than that. Nonetheless, inflation
remained low. According to the minutes of the August 2003 meeting
of the FOMC, inflation was “already near the low end of what some
members regarded as an acceptable range,” and “a number of members
expressed the view that some further disinflation was probable over the
year ahead.” While the committee was at least guardedly optimistic
about real growth over the next year, it was believed that a substantial
period of growth faster than the economy’s potential growth rate
would be needed to close “the economy’s currently wide output gap.” 
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 Because of the risk of undesired further declines in inflation—that
posed a particular risk insofar as once inflation expectations also fell, the
level of real interest rates associated with the nominal interest rate floor
would become an even higher one—the FOMC did not wish to
tighten policy, despite the improving outlook for real activity. In this
regard, it was not judged to be enough that they leave the funds rate
target at 1 percent, for, as explained in the first section of the paper, it
is primarily the expected future path of the funds rate (and other short
rates tied fairly closely to it) that affects spending and pricing deci-
sions, rather than the current level of the funds rate. And there was
concern that the public’s expectations regarding the future path of
interest rates could move sharply upward as news about the real
economy improved because of the way in which the FOMC typically
had responded to improvements in real activity in the past (as
described, for example, by the Taylor rule). These expectations, if
allowed to respond in that apparently reasonable way, might slow the
recovery of real activity and plunge the U.S. economy into deflation. 
The minutes of the August meeting indicate the committee’s concern
with the recent evolution of market expectations, as indicated by long-
term bond yields. The minutes discuss the “dramatic” increase in the
10-year Treasury yield in particular that had occurred in July (see Chart
2). “The increase appeared to be based on a number of factors, includ-
ing investors’ interpretation of the chairman’s congressional testimony,
the release of committee members’ relatively bullish economic projec-
tions, and incoming news regarding the economy and corporate
earnings that was seen as signaling a more likely upturn in economic
growth,” as a result of which the markets were evidently anticipating
that increases in the funds rate might come as early as the fall. While
the minutes do not clearly identify the reason for the FOMC’s decision
to introduce an explicit comment on the likely nature of future policy
into its post-meeting statement on this occasion, it seems likely that the
committee’s concern with movements in long-term bond yields on the
basis of speculation about future policy decisions was an important
element in the decision to not leave the judgment of the market about
this matter to guesswork.30
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After reporting that the funds rate operating target would remain at
1 percent for another month and assessing the “balance of risks” (“the
committee judges that, on balance, the risk of inflation becoming
undesirably low is likely to be the predominant concern for the foresee-
able future”), the statement included a final sentence of a new type: “In
these circumstances, the committee believes that policy accommoda-
tion can be maintained for a considerable period.” While no outright
commitment was made, the minutes indicate that the members in
favor of this statement believed it likely “that the committee would
want to keep policy accommodative for a longer period than had been
the practice in past periods of accelerating economic activity.” 
In fact, the committee acted as though it regarded itself as commit-
ted not to raise rates, without some months of advance warning. The
“considerable period” language was repeated in the statements released
following each of the next three meetings as well (in other words,
through the end of 2003).31 When the likelihood of interest rate
increases by the middle of 2004 became apparent, the fact that the
funds rate would not remain at 1 percent indefinitely was indicated by
dropping the “considerable period” language.32 Instead, the final
sentence of the statement released following the meeting at the end of
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Chart 2
The Federal Funds Rate Target and the 10-Year Treasury Rate 
Note: Comments about likely future FOMC policy in post-meeting statements are indicated by letter codes: C =
“considerable period,” P = “patience,” and M = “measured pace.”
 January 2004 said that “the committee believes that it can be patient in
removing its policy accommodation.” According to the minutes, “all
the members agreed that a change in wording was desirable, not to
signal a policy tightening move in the near term, but rather to increase
the committee’s flexibility to take such an action when it was deemed
to be desirable and to underline that any such decision would be made
on the basis of evolving economic conditions.” This language was
included again in the March 2004 statement, while the May 2004
statement instead indicated that “the committee believes that policy
accommodation can be removed at a pace that is likely to be meas-
ured.” Even at this meeting, the funds rate target was not raised, but
notice had been given that it would now be raised, albeit at a “measured
pace.” The funds rate target was indeed raised, beginning at the next
meeting; it has now (at the time of writing) been raised by 2.25
percentage points, through a succession of quarter-point increases at
nine successive meetings. Throughout this period of steady increases,
the post-meeting statements have continued to include the reference to
expecting to remove policy accommodation at a “measured pace.” 
What has the new policy of commenting on the likelihood of future
changes in the funds rate target achieved? The “considerable period”
language seems to have been intended to influence market expecta-
tions in a way that would stimulate additional spending—higher
spending, that is, than would have occurred if expectations had been
allowed to change in the direction that it was feared they would in the
absence of such assurances from the FOMC. As in the scenario
described by Eggertsson and Woodford, a statement that interest rates
would be kept low for a longer period of time was able to substitute
for an immediate cut in rates.33The signal, furthermore, seemed to be
effective. Gov. Ben Bernanke, speaking the following year, argued
that “the language of the statement in August 2003 and subsequent
meetings persuaded the markets that an autumn tightening was not
in the cards, and market expectations adjusted accordingly. Crucially,
this change in expectations resulted in lower interest rates at all matu-
rities, a development that helped support the expansion in the latter
part of last year” (Bernanke, 2004). The decline in the 10-year bond
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 rate following the introduction of this commitment is shown in
Chart 2. While bond yields move for a variety of reasons, this decline,
even as fears of deflation dissipated and the outlook for the real
economy continued to improve, suggests that the new communica-
tion policy had its intended effect on expectations.34
The eventual transition to a higher level for the funds rate also has
been managed in a way that has involved few surprises for the markets
and that has not resulted in a bond market rout, sending long rates to
levels greater than those consistent with the intended medium-term
level of interest rates. As it became clear in spring 2004 that the
commitment to maintain rates at their existing (historically low) level
was about to end, with no indication from the Fed as to how dramatic
a change in policy might be coming, long bond yields again rose fairly
sharply. But the introduction of the commitment to a “measured
pace” in May allowed long rates to decline again, as shown in Chart
2. Since then, it has been possible to increase the funds rate target by
a total of 2 percentage points, while the 10-year bond rate remains (at
the time of writing) at about the same level as it was late in 2003, and
below the level that it had reached in the summer of 2003, prior to
the introduction of the “considerable period” language. This sort of
outcome is not especially paradoxical when increases in the funds rate
target occur within the context of a funds rate path that was already
fairly predictable, so that the increases themselves cause no change in
market expectations about the likely level of interest rates over the
next several years (and may actually contribute to lower expectations
regarding nominal interest rates some years out, insofar as they
confirm that the central bank will be vigilant to contain inflation).
Bernanke (2004) suggests that the new communications policy also
likely has contributed to a recent decline in “overall financial market
volatility...by reducing the uncertainty surrounding the future course
of policy.” 
The degree to which recent decisions about the funds rate operating
target have failed to surprise financial markets is shown in Chart 3. In
the chart, bars indicate the size of the changes in the FOMC’s funds
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 rate operating target that occurred at various dates in the period
2001-2004. Associated with each date at which there was a change
(or at which there was a meeting at which the FOMC chose not to
change the target, so that the announcement of no change was itself
news) is an asterisk indicating the size (in basis points) of the compo-
nent of this change that was not already anticipated by financial
markets just before the announcement.35 One observes that begin-
ning with the August 2003 meeting, the surprise components of
federal funds rate target announcements have been extremely small.
Surprises were typically larger in earlier periods, even in periods
when the target was left unchanged for several meetings in a row, and
especially at times when a loosening or tightening cycle began, as in
early 2001. Recently, instead, the surprises have been negligible, even
when the Fed moved from its constant 1 percent target to a period
of steady tightening. 
At the same time, this does not mean that FOMC announcements
have failed to affect the markets. In a recent paper, Gurkaynak (2005)
investigates the effects of the release of FOMC statements on market
expectations (as indicated by the fed funds futures market) regarding
what the funds rate will be between the current meeting and the next,
what it will be after the next meeting, and what it will be after the
meeting after that. (The first of these changes in expectations is the
“policy surprise” plotted in Chart 3.) Gurkaynak finds that while
there has been almost no change in expectations regarding the current
funds rate, there still have been changes in expectations regarding
what the funds rate will be further in the future. 
In particular, what he calls “slope surprises” (indicated by the circles
in Chart 336)—changes in expectations regarding the funds rate two
meetings in the future, over and above what one would typically
expect, given the news about the current funds rate target and the one
expected to be chosen at the next meeting—have continued to be
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 about two-thirds as volatile since the fall of 2003 as they were previ-
ously, over the period (since early 1998) for which they can be
measured.37 This indicates that under the new regime, FOMC state-
ments still change expectations regarding the future path of the funds
rate—which, as argued above, is essential if they are to affect the
economy—but they now achieve this without a need for surprise
changes in the current funds rate target.38 Insofar as the avoidance of
unexpected movements in short-term rates is desirable, to the extent
that it is possible without compromising other stabilization objec-
tives, this can be judged an improvement in the skill with which
monetary policy is conducted.39
The primary difficulty associated with the new policy of signaling
funds rate target changes in advance has been some degree of discom-
fort, among at least some members of the FOMC, with the degree to
which statements of this kind constrain the policy decisions that can
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Chart 3
Federal Funds Rate Target Changes (Indicated by the Bars), the
Surprise Component of Each Change (Indicated by the Asterisks),
and Change in the “Slope Factor” (Indicated by the Circles)








Sources: target changes: Federal Reserve Board; policy shocks: Gurkaynak and others (2005); slope
factor: Gurkaynak (2005)
 be made at later meetings.40 Of course, one of the advantages of such
statements that I have suggested above is precisely that they can
constrain a policy committee to not behave in the way that would
otherwise seem appropriate ex post. Such constraint can be desirable
because of the benefits that flow from being anticipated to conduct
policy in a history-dependent fashion. For example, in the case of the
optimal state-contingent policy depicted in Chart 1, it would be
important that the central bank feel itself constrained not to raise
interest rates in quarter 15, despite the fact that it has learned that
(relatively unexpectedly) the natural rate of interest has returned to its
normal, positive level, and despite the fact that failing to do so means
creating a mildly inflationary boom. Policymakers who reason like
discretionary optimizers indeed will be uncomfortable with such
behavior, and they would be right to anticipate—when considering
the advisability of such a commitment at the earlier time—that they
subsequently will find the commitment an annoying constraint. But
a policymaker who thinks more deeply should realize that it is,
nonetheless, desirable to constrain oneself, at least in the case that the
constraint can be expected to be understood by the public. 
But in all likelihood, the discomfort is not solely due to a failure to
understand the logic of Kydland and Prescott (1977), but also to frus-
tration with the crudeness of the kinds of commitments that can be
made using such simple statements as the ones just paraphrased. The
signals that have been given thus far through the post-meeting state-
ments all attempt to say something about the likely path of the funds
rate for the next several months. They refer (in a way that is open to
interpretation) to rates of change and periods of time, but, except for
the constant qualification that the statement is only an indication of
“likely” policy, they do not speak of the way in which future policy
should be contingent on circumstances that are not already evident. If
the statements are interpreted as commitments to particular non-state-
contingent paths for the funds rate—albeit commitments that specify
the path only for a fairly short distance ahead—then they are likely to
constrain policy in ways that are not fully ideal. 
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 For while an optimal policy commitment generally will imply that
policy should be history-dependent, as stressed above, it also generally
will imply that policy should be state-contingent as well. For example,
in the policy problem considered by Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), the optimal policy involves keeping the nominal interest rate
at its lower bound for several quarters even after the natural rate
returns to its normal level. But the exact number of quarters for which
this should be done depends on the evolution of the exogenous distur-
bance, and it is not known until date T is reached. Moreover, the fact
that, in the particular numerical exercise considered in Chart 1, it is
possible to make a definite commitment once period T is reached
depends on the fact that there is assumed to be no further uncertainty
about the evolution of fundamentals after date T. In the case of a more
general disturbance process {r n
t}, the number of periods for which
interest rates should be kept low also will depend on the path of the
natural rate after it again has become positive. Under an optimal
policy, the central bank generally would not know whether it was yet
time to raise rates until the time to do so was reached. 
The kind of commitment that needs to be communicated, in order
to allow a closer approximation to fully optimal policy, is one that
would indicate the way in which future policy should depend on
future economic developments. This might seem so complex as to
not be usefully explained to the public, but my own view is that even
a very general indication of the kind of factors that should be crucial
for future policy decisions greatly would help to clarify the public’s
view of the likely state-contingent evolution of interest rates and of
the economy. In the context of the simple policy problem considered
above, Eggertsson and Woodford show that the optimal time and
degree to which interest rates eventually should be raised can be
explained in terms of a fairly simple formula. Under the policy rule
that they propose,41 the central bank should set its policy rate so as to
achieve a particular pre-announced target level for an output-gap-
adjusted price-level target,42 to the extent that this is consistent with
the interest rate lower bound. The interest rate, thus, will be kept at
the lower bound as long as it continues to be impossible to reach (or
Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness 437
 exceed) this target, even with interest rates at the lower bound. Rates
should be raised above the lower bound once the target level for the
output-gap-adjusted price level is reached, and not sooner. A commit-
ment of this kind would imply that the lower bound policy should be
expected to continue for a considerable period, in the case that the
output-gap-adjusted price level is currently well below the target. A
policy commitment that emphasized this target (and, hence, the size
of the gap that would remain to be closed at any given time) even
would allow the private sector some basis for judging the likely length
of such a period. But it also would imply automatically that increases
in interest rates likely would be appropriate soon, as the gap with
respect to the target shrank, and, furthermore, would provide guid-
ance as to how policy should be expected to be conducted thereafter,
all without any need for a change in the language of the commitment.
And it would be a form of commitment that would make evident the
state contingency of the implied path of interest rates. 
The FOMC has made some effort to communicate the contingent
nature of its statements about the outlook for future policy.43 In
December 2003, the statement that rates were likely to remain low
for a “considerable period” was linked explicitly to the observation of
“inflation quite low and resource use slack.” According to the minutes
of the January 2004 meeting, this language had been intended to
“underscor[e] the notion that a move away from the current degree of
policy accommodation would depend on economic conditions rather
than simply on the passage of time.” These minutes also indicated
that the language adopted in the statement released after the January
meeting, referring to “patience” rather than to a “considerable
period,” was intended to indicate more clearly that an increase in
interest rates later in the year was possible, “and to underline that any
such decision would be made on the basis of evolving economic
conditions.” While the reference to “patience” itself may have been a
rather cryptic way of indicating that policy would be state contingent,
the eventual publication of the minutes would have made this clearer.
The current policy of expedited release of the minutes makes the
possibility of clarifying the state-contingent character of future policy
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 through the minutes, rather than through the post-meeting statement
itself, a realistic possibility.44
It likely would be desirable for the FOMC to experiment further
with clarifications of this kind. As the period in which regular quarter-
point interest rate increases at each meeting were fully predictable
comes to an end, it will become more important for the FOMC to
attempt to communicate about the state-contingent character of
policy, if it is to comment on future policy at all. Recent experience
suggests that comments on future policy can help, both in reducing
the number of policy surprises and in keeping bond-market expecta-
tions in line with the FOMC’s own outlook for rates over the
medium term, and these indications of success in steering expecta-
tions should increase the effectiveness of policy. But a continuation of
this success under more normal circumstances will require the devel-
opment of more flexible ways of speaking about the likely character
of future policy. 
Assumptions about future policy in inflation-forecast targeting
Probably the most important advances in communications policy
over the past 10 to 15 years have been made by the inflation-targeting
central banks, among which banks such as the Sveriges Riksbank, the
Bank of England, and the RBNZ have been especially important
innovators in the development of new methods of communication
with the markets and the general public. The Inflation Reports of these
banks provide good practical examples of communication with the
public about the central bank’s policy commitments.These reports do
not pretend to give a blow-by-blow account of the deliberations by
which the central bank reached the position that it has determined
to announce, but they do explain the analysis behind the decision
that has been reached. This analysis provides information about the
bank’s systematic approach to policy by illustrating its application to
the concrete circumstances that have arisen since the last report; and
it provides information about how conditions are likely to develop
in the future through explicit discussion of the bank’s own 
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 projections. Because the analysis is made public, it can be expected
to shape future deliberations; the bank knows that it should be
expected to explain why views expressed in the past are not later
being followed. Thus, a commitment to transparency of this sort
helps to make policy more fully rule-based, as well as increasing the
public’s understanding of the rule.
The periodic publication of Inflation Reports is a key element in the
kind of policy regime that Svensson (1999) calls “inflation-forecast
targeting.” Under this approach, the central bank does not only
announce a quantitative target (its inflation target) that defines the
goal of policy. It also is committed to a particular kind of decision
procedure, under which projections are made of the future evolution
of inflation and other variables under a particular assumed stance of
policy, and the assumed policy is to be implemented (until the matter
is reconsidered in the next decision cycle) only if the projections
satisfy a certain target criterion. For example, in the case of the Bank
of England, the criterion given primary emphasis (at least in the
public justification of the policy decisions that are taken) is one that
requires projected CPI inflation to equal 2 percent at a horizon eight
quarters in the future.45 And finally, it explains its policy decisions to
the public in terms of its conformity with the target criterion. In the
case of the central banks just mentioned, this means the publication
of Inflation Reports several times per year that give prominent atten-
tion to the projections that justify the current stance of policy. 
While the development of inflation-forecast targeting represents a
substantial advance, both in the commitment of central banks to the
conduct of policy in accordance with an explicit rule and in the trans-
parency of communication with the public about policy deliberations,
the precise techniques that are used continue to be refined. One of the
most debated aspects of current practice has been the question of what
kind of assumption to make about the future conduct of policy when
preparing the projections that will be used to judge the appropriateness
of current policy. 
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 Constant interest rate projections
Computation of projected paths for variables such as inflation and
output some years into the future requires that one make assumptions
about the future conduct of monetary policy—at least over the
horizon of the projection, and, in the case of a model of the transmis-
sion mechanism that incorporates forward-looking behavior by the
private sector, even farther. This is a particularly delicate aspect of
such exercises because of the implied need for the central bank to take
a stand on the question of how it is likely to conduct policy in the
future, and even more critically, because of concern that public
discussion of the assumptions being made could be interpreted as a
statement of the bank’s intentions. Statements of intentions regarding
future policy often have been regarded as problematic, for reasons of
the kind already discussed above. 
A common way of seeking to avoid any statement about future
policy has been to base policy deliberations—or at least, the way these
deliberations are presented in the banks’ Inflation Reports—on projec-
tions of the future evolution of inflation and other variables under an
assumption that the interest rate target (repo rate) will remain constant
over the horizon of the projection, at the level that is chosen currently.
(This was, for example, the assumption made in the base-case projec-
tions that were presented in the overview section of the Bank of
England Inflation Reports, prior to August 2004, and it is still the
assumption made in the base-case projections in the Inflation Reports
of the Sveriges Riksbank.) The policy decision is then a search for an
interest rate such that constant interest rate projections based on that
rate satisfy a target criterion (for example, the requirement that
projected CPI inflation equal 2 percent two years in the future).46The
Inflation Reports then justify the interest rate decision that most
recently has been made by presenting these projections and noting
that they conform fairly well to the criterion in question. 
This way of avoiding any need for the central bank to show its cards
with regard to future policy has the advantage of being simple to
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 explain to the public—as long as the public is not sophisticated
enough to ask what it really means—but has a number of unappeal-
ing implications.47 First of all, many optimizing models of the
monetary transmission mechanism have the property first demon-
strated by Sargent and Wallace (1975) for a rational-expectations
IS-LM framework, namely that the equilibrium path of the price level
(and, hence, of the inflation rate) is indeterminate under the assump-
tion of a fixed nominal interest rate (or indeed, any exogenously
specified interest rate process).48 If such a model were to be used for
the central bank’s projection exercise, the staff would be unable to
compute predicted paths for inflation or other variables under the
hypothesis of any constant level of nominal interest rate, and so
unable to assert that one particular level would imply satisfaction of
the target criterion.49
Alternatively, many backward-looking models (including optimiz-
ing models in which expectations are assumed to be based on
extrapolation from past time series) have the property discussed by
Friedman (1968), namely that maintaining a constant nominal inter-
est rate indefinitely will lead to explosive inflation dynamics, through
a Wicksellian “cumulative process.”50 Goodhart (2001) suggests that
the Bank of England’s model has this latter property, and that as a
result, “the rate of change of most variables visible at the two-year
horizon in the Bank’s forecast generally (though not invariably) tends
to persist, and on occasion to accelerate, in the third and subsequent
years” (p. 171).51 An example of this property is shown in the box on
pp. 42-43 of the August 2004 Inflation Report (Bank of England,
2004b), where the constant interest rate inflation projection from the
February 2004 report is extended another year into the future. While
the projection showed CPI inflation rising to about 2 percent, under
the most likely scenario, by early 2006, it showed inflation continu-
ing to rise to about 2.4 percent by early 2007, with no indication of
convergence even at that level. In this case, it is possible to ask which
constant interest rate would imply satisfaction of the target criterion
at a certain finite horizon, but only at the expense of making it clear
that hitting the target at (say) the eight-quarter horizon does not also
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 imply expecting to hit it in subsequent quarters. Hence, it cannot be
the case that one expects to be content to maintain the constant inter-
est rate policy indefinitely, even in the absence of any developments
that cannot already be foreseen. 
Moreover, if one’s model currently implies that inflation will depart
significantly from the target rate at the three-year horizon if interest
rates are maintained at their current level for that long, then it also
implies that one should expect that a year from now—barring unfore-
seen developments—if interest rates have been maintained at their
current level, it then will be forecasted that inflation will depart from
the target at the two-year horizon if interest rates are not changed. For
example, in the case just mentioned, the projection in February 2004,
based on an assumption that the repo rate would remain at 4 percent
over the following three years, showed CPI inflation accelerating to
about 2.4 percent by early 2007. But this projection then would imply
that under the most likely scenario, keeping the repo rate at 4 percent
throughout 2004 would be expected to result in the Bank’s projecting
in February 2005 that CPI inflation should reach 2.4 percent in only
two years, at which point (if not sooner), the exercise should require
the repo rate to be raised. Thus, the projection would imply that one
should not expect the repo rate to remain at its current level for an
entire year, even in the absence of any “news.” It should have been
expected to be raised fairly soon, as indeed it was (by 75 basis points
over the next six months). 
The publication of constant interest rate projections—and the
public justification of policy decisions by reference to them—is in no
way intended to suggest that the central bank intends to maintain
interest rates constant over the period of the projection. (Indeed, the
most important justification for the use of constant interest rate
projections seems to be a desire not to express any intention regard-
ing future policy.) Nor can it be defended as representing the central
bank’s own best current estimate of the future path of interest rates.
After all, the implication of the projections explained above would be
evident above all within the central bank itself.52 
Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness 443
 But this implies that the targeting procedure is based on forecasts
that actually are not believed, even in the central bank itself. Such a
procedure has the paradoxical implication that the central bank may
choose a policy under which it truly does not expect the target crite-
rion to be satisfied, though it may believe that it would be under the
counterfactual hypothesis of the constant interest rate.53 Such a state
of affairs can hardly be defended as conducive to transparency in the
conduct of monetary policy. If policy is genuinely based on constant
interest rate conditional projections, then one’s policy decisions are not
aimed at ensuring satisfaction of the target criterion that is announced
to the public. The projections published by the central bank are not
accurate forecasts that should better help the private sector to antici-
pate correctly the economy’s evolution. On the other hand, if the
central bank genuinely does expect the target criterion to be satisfied,
then policy actually is not determined in the way that the official rhet-
oric implies that it is. And if the forecasts are unbiased, then they are
not the kind of forecasts that they are described officially as being. 
Projections based on market expectations
The Bank of England evidently has accepted the force of at least
some of the criticisms that have been raised of the use of constant
interest rate projections, and since the August 2004 Inflation Report,
it has ceased to emphasize those projections in its justification of
current policy..54 It now focuses its evaluation of policy on a set of
projections that are conditional on the path of short-term interest
rates implied by the term structure of yields on longer-term Treasury
securities.55 This allows the projections to be based on a more realis-
tic assumption regarding future interest rates, while still allowing the
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to remain silent as to whether
the interest rate assumptions used in the projection exercise agree
with its own.56 The way in which these projections are used in the
MPC’s decision procedure has not been discussed explicitly. Appar-
ently, the idea is that if the projections based on market expectations
satisfy the target criterion, then the MPC should set the repo rate at
the level expected by the markets. Thus, in August 2004, the rate was
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 raised from 4.5 to 4.75 percent to conform to market expectations of
a repo rate averaging 4.6 in 2004:Q3 and rising to an average of 4.9
in 2004:Q4. In November 2004, it was left unchanged because
market expectations at this time forecasted only an average of 4.7 in
both 2004:Q4 and 2005:Q1. And in February 2005, it was again left
unchanged because this continued to be what the markets expected.57
If the projections based on market expectations were to fail to satisfy
the target criterion, then presumably policy should deviate from the
market expectation, though it is not clear by how much; this situa-
tion appears not yet to have arisen. 
While this alternative avoids some of the problems associated with
constant interest rate projections, it does not avoid all of them and
introduces some new problems of its own.58 The problems of incon-
sistency that arise when policy deliberations (or at least the public
justification of these deliberations) are based on an interest rate
assumption different from what the MPC believes is most likely to
occur remain, as long as the assumed path does not actually represent
the MPC’s forecast. The new approach makes the contradiction less
glaring, since it is no longer obvious in which particular way the
MPC should be expecting something different from what is assumed.
But if the MPC does disagree with the assumed interest rate path, the
procedure is still incoherent and/or misleading, and it is hard to see
how continued coyness of the MPC as to whether it agrees or not
with its stated assumptions can serve the goal of clarifying the way in
which policy is conducted. 
The problem that the interest rate assumption would not allow an
equilibrium path to be computed, in the case of a standard forward-
looking model, or would imply unstable dynamics, in the case of
many backward-looking models, also is not avoided by the new
proposal. These problems arise whenever a path for the nominal inter-
est rate is assumed that is independent of the evolution of the
endogenous variables in the model. They have nothing to do with the
constancy of the assumed path.59 When a particular path for interest
rates is inferred from the term structure and plugged into a model of
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 the monetary transmission mechanism as if it were given exogenously,
the same problems will arise as in the case of a constant interest rate
assumption. (Even if nominal interest rates are assumed to rise over the
coming year, the fact that they are assumed to rise by an amount inde-
pendent of any increase in inflation gives rise to unstable dynamics.
Higher inflation will lower the real interest rate, stimulating higher
inflation, and so on.) The only solution for this problem is to include
in one’s model a realistic representation of endogenous variation in
short-term nominal interest rates. 
At the same time, a decision procedure using projections based on
market expectations introduces some new problems. Most impor-
tantly, it runs the risk of making policy too sensitive to market
expectations regarding policy, in a way that fails to provide any
anchor for those expectations or any stable course for policy. Consider
an extreme version of the approach to policy sketched above, in
which the central bank simply infers market expectations regarding
the path of its policy rate, and sets the rate in accordance with market
expectations. As Blinder (1998) points out, “following the markets”
in this way would be quite dangerous, for there would then be no
reason for the markets to expect one kind of policy rather than any
other. Arbitrary notions easily could become self-fulfilling and the
sources of significant instability and/or inefficiency. 
Of course, the approach to policy that apparently has been adopted
by the Bank of England is more sophisticated than that. There is no
commitment to follow the markets’ lead, unless the bank’s projections
imply that doing so is consistent with a projection of inflation near 2
percent two years in the future. But it is not clear to what extent such
a qualification should succeed in preventing fluctuations because of
self-fulfilling expectations. This is because, even when arbitrary fluctu-
ations of that kind occur, inflation may still be (correctly) predicted at
any point in time to revert back to its target level within a few quarters. 
As an example, consider the simple model of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism discussed above, according to which inflation
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 and output are determined each period by equations (2.1) and (2.2).
Let stbe an exogenous random process that has no relation to economic
“fundamentals”60—what is sometimes called a “sunspot” variable—and
suppose that its dynamics can be described by a first-order autoregres-
sive equation, 
st = ρst–1 +   , (3.1)
where 0<ρ<1 is the coefficient of autocorrelation and {    } is a bounded
white-noise disturbance. I wish to consider the possibility of an equi-
librium in which inflation and output fluctuate in response to
variation in the sunspot variable, simply because people have come
(for arbitrary reasons) to expect this and have observed that the vari-
able does indeed help them to forecast the economy’s future evolution.
Consider, for example, the possibility of an equilibrium in which 
πt = φst,
for some coefficient φ ≠ 0. Equation (2.1) will be satisfied as long as
the equilibrium fluctuations in the output gap are given by 
xt =          φst.
Equation (2.2) also will be satisfied as long as the nominal interest
rate satisfies 
it = rn
t + [ρ – (1 – ρ) (    )σ –1]φst. (3.2)
Now, suppose that in each period t, the exogenous state of the
world (including the current values of rn
t and st) is first revealed; then
futures markets are open, in which traders bet on the value of that
period’s interest rate it ; and finally, the central bank chooses its oper-
ating target for it, after learning the market forecast it|t  implied by the
futures prices, and period t inflation and output are then determined
in accordance with equations (2.1) – (2.2). In the equilibrium just
conjectured, the market expectation should be given by 







n +[ρ – (1 – ρ)(    )σ–1] φst.
If the central bank observes this, and sets it=i t|t, then (3.2) will be
satisfied, and the equations given above for inflation and output will
represent a rational-expectations equilibrium. 
But should the central bank be willing to follow the markets and set
it =i t|t? In the equilibrium just described, a correct forecast of the
future path of inflation in any period will be given by 
Etπt+j =ρ
jφst,
for arbitrary j ≥ 0.61 If the central bank forecasts in this way, condi-
tional on policy that coincides with market expectations, it will
conclude that the inflation rate should converge back to its long-run
target value (here assumed to equal zero62) as the horizon j is extended
farther into the future; and this will be true no matter how large φ is,
and, hence, no matter how large the short-run fluctuations in inflation
and output because of self-fulfilling expectations may be. Further-
more, if ρ is not close to 1, the convergence will be predicted to be
nearly complete after only a few quarters.63 It, thus, is not obvious that
a central bank that pays attention only to the projected inflation rate
two or more years in the future would find any reason not to follow
the markets at all times, even if this policy allowed large transitory fluc-
tuations in inflation (and associated large swings in output relative to
potential) to occur, due solely to self-fulfilling expectations.64
One might argue that in the case just described, the possibility of
fluctuations in response to the sunspot disturbance would be elimi-
nated as long as the central bank were to establish a reputation for
responding to even small departures of the projected inflation rate
two years in the future from the target value. For example, if the




κ rfor some coefficient ψ>0where Êtπt+8 represents the central bank’s
projection of inflation eight periods in the future, conditional on its
conducting policy in the way anticipated in the futures markets, then
the only possible rational-expectations equilibrium would have to be
one in which Êtπt+8=0 at all times. This would preclude any equilib-
rium of the kind conjectured above, except the one with φ=0.
However, this result depends on assuming that the central bank
would respond systematically (albeit to only a small extent) to even
small departures from satisfaction of its target criterion, which seems
unlikely given that the policy rate is ordinarily moved only in discrete
steps. More to the point, even rule (3.3) would allow the existence of
sunspot fluctuations of arbitrary amplitude, in the case of a sunspot
variable st that evolved as an MA(7) process (or any lower-order MA
process), so that  Etst+8=0 at all times. 
Another problem with the current procedure of the Bank of
England is that it is unclear how the MPC intended to determine the
correct current repo rate in the event that the interest rate path
expected by the markets is judged to imply projections inconsistent
with the Bank’s target criterion. Would an attempt be made to deter-
mine the current repo rate that would lead to an acceptable
projection, under the assumption that the path of the repo rate after
the current month would follow the path anticipated by the markets?
This would typically require an extreme adjustment of the current
repo rate, as a change in the repo rate for only one month would
have to change the path of inflation over the following two years by
enough to get the projected inflation rate two years in the future on
track. A more sensible approach surely would involve adjusting the
entire path of interest rates to one that the MPC would view as more
sound, rather than acting as if the committee expected itself to
behave in the future in the way currently anticipated by the markets,
even though it was planning to depart substantially from the
markets’ expectation in the short run. But in this case, projections
would have to be produced on the basis of an assumption about
future policy other than the one corresponding to market expecta-
tions. The idea that the MPC would be able to avoid taking a stand
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 (at least in its internal deliberations) on a reasonable future path of
interest rates, by insisting on using the markets’ forecast in its projec-
tions, is not tenable. 
Projections based on a model of central bank behavior
The kind of forecast-targeting procedure recommended by Svensson
and Woodford (2005) as a way of implementing optimal monetary
policy is of a different sort than either of the two approaches just
discussed. In this procedure, one projects the economy’s future evolu-
tion under alternative contemplated policy decisions, assuming that in
future decision cycles the central bank again will act to ensure satisfac-
tion of the target criterion. This amounts to asking what action is
needed in order to project that the criterion should be satisfied in the
current period, taking as given that it is expected to be satisfied in later
periods (as a result of the policy actions to be taken in those periods).
Such a calculation yields a determinate outcome as long as there is a
determinate rational-expectations equilibrium implied by the target
criterion. This is always the case if the target criterion is selected
according to the method of Giannoni and Woodford (2002). 
Thus, I would argue that policy should be based on a projection
exercise that includes a model of the central bank’s own future behav-
ior—one that is furthermore consistent with the procedure that it
actually follows in making its policy decisions. This is the kind of
projection exercise used as the basis for policy decisions at some central
banks, notably the RBNZ which also publishes some information
about the nonconstant interest rate path implicit in its projections,
along with its projections for inflation and other variables.65
Charles Goodhart (2001, 2005) objects that such a procedure is
impractical, on the ground that it would be much more difficult for
a monetary policy committee to reach agreement on an entire future
path for interest rates, rather than allowing the committee to decide
only about the current interest rate each time it meets. But the
procedure described by Svensson and Woodford does not involve a
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 multidimensional decision problem in each decision cycle. As with
the constant interest rate projection method, one makes a decision
for the current period only, on the basis of projections of the future
that (necessarily) incorporate a hypothesis about future policy. The
hypothesis about future policy is simply a more realistic one than the
notion that interest rates will not change, regardless of how inflation
and output evolve. And there is no greater need for agreement
among the members of the policy committee about that particular
aspect of the model specification than about the other assumptions
involved in making projections for the future.66 The fact that the
Inflation Reports of Norges Bank have begun to include projected
paths for money-market interest rates that (at least for the final two
years of the projection period) represent the judgment of the bank
rather than market expectations also suggests that agreement on a
path is not necessarily such a complex multidimensional decision. 
Goodhart also argues that revealing a projected nonconstant path for
interest rates is problematic because “any indication that the MPC is
formally indicating a future specific change in rates...would be taken to
indicate some degree of commitment” (2001, p. 175).67 This is clearly
a delicate issue in the proper explanation to the public of how the
central bank’s projections are to be interpreted. Yet the danger is not as
great in this case as in the case of the signals regarding future policy that
recently have been included in the post-meeting statements of the
FOMC in the United States. For as has just been noted, the MPC
would not have to decide on a forward path for interest rates, which is
then fed into the bank’s model in order to generate the projections.
Instead, the model could incorporate an equation representing typical
policy. The resulting projections would include a path for the policy
rate, and to the extent to which the MPC announced that this projec-
tion represented its best judgment about how the economy was likely
to evolve, it would be endorsing a forecast of its future decisions. But it
would be fairly easy in this case for the discussion of the projections to
include a disclaimer stating that the interest-rate projection is not
intended to pre-judge the policy decisions that the MPC actually will
make at later dates. 
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 And the experience of New Zealand suggests that it is possible to
reveal interest rate projections to the public without being under-
stood to have made an advance commitment about the path of the
official cash rate. Archer (2004) discusses the RBNZ’s experience
with the publication of a forward path for interest rates. While he
mentions the possibility of the projected interest rate path’s being
misinterpreted “as a policy plan” (p.9), this is cited as a concern
expressed to him by other central bankers, rather than as a problem
that has arisen in practice in New Zealand. The main practical
problem that he cites with regard to the publication of an interest rate
path is that it has not always been possible to produce a model-based
projection that coincided with the policymaker’s assessment of the
likely future path of interest rates, in which case the quantitative
projection and the discussion of future policy in the Monetary Policy
Statement do not agree with one another. According to Archer, “it is
noteworthy that on all such occasions, market analysts and position
takers expressed frustration at the inconsistency” between the two
contrasting messages regarding future policy (p. 10). The problem in
such cases has been a failure of policymaker confidence in the assump-
tions reflected in the model-based projection. It is not clear why this
problem should be greater in the case of projections regarding the path
of interest rates than with other variables, though central banks may
well be especially careful about what they say about this particular
aspect of the future outlook. 
Moreover, a “fan chart” for the path of interest rates ought to make
it clear that the bank is not committing itself to a definite path.
Rather, the expected evolution will depend on a variety of contingen-
cies that at best can be assigned probabilities. The practical possibility
of communicating about this kind of uncertainty is illustrated by the
way that the Bank of England currently discusses the interest rate
assumptions used in its projections, “based on market interest rate
expectations.” When explaining the particular interest rate path that
is assumed in the projections, the Inflation Report always takes care to
note that “there is a high probability that official interest rates will not
follow this path…. Given the great uncertainties, the economy will
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 almost certainly not evolve in the way either the MPC or the markets
expect.” And a fan chart is presented indicating the degree of market
uncertainty about interest rates at progressively longer horizons,
based on the prices of options on futures contracts.68 The fan chart
would seem an effective device for communication about the uncer-
tainty around the published interest rate path. In the case of an
interest rate path implied by a quantitative model augmented by a
policy equation, it would be possible to generate the probability
distributions that are plotted in the fan chart in the same way as the
fan charts for inflation and output are currently generated. 
Once one admits that the model used in one’s projections needs an
equation representing monetary policy, and not simply an interest
rate path as the specification of current and future policy, it, nonethe-
less, is possible to carry out exercises under which the projections are
made to be consistent with a particular interest rate path specified
from outside the model. One might add an interest rate equation to
the model representing the central bank’s reaction function (say, some
version of a Taylor rule), and then allow the intercept term in this
equation to specified arbitrarily at each future date. If one wants to
produce projections consistent with a particular constant interest rate
path, for example, one could search for the sequence of (nonconstant)
intercept terms that will result in a projected path for the (endoge-
nous) short-term nominal interest rate with exactly this feature. One
could use the same approach to produce projections consistent with
market expectations inferred from the term structure of interest rates.
An advantage of this roundabout approach over a simple postulation
of a nominal interest rate path is that it will allow one to obtain a
determinate rational-expectations equilibrium in the case of a forward-
looking model of the monetary transmission mechanism, and some
central banks have begun to use methods of this kind as a consequence
of adopting forward-looking models.69 While this would avoid one of
the problems with approaches that use an assumed interest rate path
discussed above, it solves only the problem of determinacy of equilib-
rium. Such procedures still would be vulnerable to the other criticisms
offered in the third section of the paper.
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 Thus, there seems no coherent alternative to an approach to infla-
tion-forecast targeting in which the central bank’s projections are
produced on the basis of an assumption that the MPC is willing to
make about the way in which its own future policy endogenously
should respond to alternative possible future conditions. This need not
involve an attempt to determine in advance the actual future path of
interest rates (except, of course, in a “central case” scenario that is
understood to be unlikely to actually occur), and the central bank
might or might not wish to reveal much about the interest rate path
implicit in its projections for other variables. My own view is that
communication about this path can help to facilitate the transmission
mechanism of policy. For example, Archer (2004) concludes that the
slope of the path announced by the RBNZ has affected the slope of
the market yield curve in New Zealand, and an ability to influence the
expectations reflected in the yield is exactly what a central bank should
wish, as argued in the first section of the paper. But even if a central
bank were to wish to communicate less about this aspect of its delib-
erations—and it must be admitted that even the RBNZ limits the
amount of detail with which it describes the interest rate path implied
by its projections—it should not allow such concerns to prevent it
from considering the appropriate character of future policy in its fore-
cast-targeting exercise. And to the extent that it is concerned at all
about transparency and accountability, it should not pretend to the
public that its deliberations make no assumptions about future policy. 
Conclusion
The increased willingness of the FOMC under the chairmanship of
Alan Greenspan to speak openly about both current policy decisions
and the committee’s view of likely future policy greatly has increased
the ability of markets to anticipate Fed policy. There is every reason
to believe that this has been beneficial, not only from the point of
view of reducing the uncertainty with which traders and other
economic decisionmakers must contend, but also from that of
enhancing the accuracy with which the FOMC is able to achieve the
effects on the economy that it desires, by keeping the expectations of
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 market participants more closely synchronized with its own. It is very
much to be hoped that the FOMC will continue to build on this
legacy under its next chairman. 
Despite the worldwide movement toward greater transparency and
increased communication on the part of central banks—at least as
notable in the case of the inflation-targeting central banks as it has
been in the United States—both of the case studies just discussed
indicate that there continues to be a good deal of uncertainty in
central banks about the degree to which it is desirable to publicly
indicate the bank’s own view of the likely future path of interest rates.
Nonetheless, it seems likely that in coming years central banks will
develop even more effective ways of communicating about this issue. 
In the case of the inflation-forecast-targeting central banks, the logic
of the approach to the conduct of monetary policy—and in particu-
lar, the approach to communication with the public about monetary
policy decisions—that they have already adopted (and found to be
largely successful) will, in my view, almost inevitably force these banks
to base the projections that are at the heart of their public explana-
tion of their policy decisions on an explicit model of their own likely
future approach to policy. Their existing commitment to trans-
parency also will require them to publicly explain the assumptions
about future policy that are implicit in such projections, at least to
some extent, and with suitable caveats about the fact that such policy
assumptions do not represent a commitment to actually set policy in
the precise way indicated by the projection. Insofar as the FOMC
increases the amount that it makes public about the projections upon
which its own deliberations are made—which certainly would be a
logical development of the current trend toward greater transparency,
even if the Fed does not adopt inflation targeting—this also could
become an issue that will have to be confronted at the Fed under the
next chairman. 
One cannot be quite as certain about the future role of explicit indi-
cations about the expected path of interest rates of the kind with
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 which the FOMC has experimented over the past two years. Thus far,
I believe that the new approach has been a successful one. On the
other hand, one might argue that this kind of explicit comment on the
intended path of interest rates (as opposed to more general discussion
of the considerations that will be taken into account in future policy
decisions) is most useful under relatively special circumstances, such as
the ones faced by the Fed in summer 2003. Other ways of guiding
expectations about future policy might prove more suitable under
more ordinary conditions. At the very least, an extension of the
current policy will require the development of a more extensive lexicon
of possible statements about expected future policy. But while Fed
communication policy surely will develop further, the challenge of
efficient communication with the markets about the future conduct of
policy is one that should continue to engage the FOMC in coming
years, and the relative success of recent innovations should encourage
further efforts to increase the degree to which the FOMC is able to
share its view of the future evolution of policy with the public. 
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 Appendix 
The Model of Morris and Shin (2002)
Morris and Shin consider a stylized game in which each of a contin-
uum of market participants, indexed by i, chooses an action ai (a real
number) after observing a public signal y and a private signal xi. As
explained in the text, the payoff of each agent i depends on her own
action ai, the average action a chosen by market participants as a
whole, and an unknown “fundamental” state θ (another real number).
The public signal is common knowledge, and given by 
y = θ+η,
where the random noise term η is independently of the value of θ,
according to a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1/α.
Each of the market participants’ private signal is given by 
xi =θ +  i,
where the random noise term  i is distributed independently of θ, η,
and each of the other  j, according to a normal distribution with
mean zero and variance 1/β. Thus, α and β measure the precision of
the public and private signals, respectively. 
Morris and Shin assume that the payoff of each market participant
inversely is related to a loss function of the form 
Li.MS≡ (1−r)(ai – θ)2 + r [Ej (aj – ai )2 – EkEj (aj  – ak)2 ], (A.1)
where 0 < r< 1 and, as in the text, I use the notation Ej(.)for the average
of some quantity over the continuum of agents indexed by j.70 This
differs from the specification (1.1) given in the text by the presence of
the second term inside the square brackets. The additional term is addi-
tive and independent of the action of agent i, so it has no effect on
equilibrium behavior. It matters only for the evaluation of welfare, and
is introduced by Morris and Shin to justify their assumption that the
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∋
∋
∋dispersion of actions across market participants is of no consequence
for welfare, even though it is a concern that is given considerable
weight in the decisions of individuals. 
Under these preferences, (whether written as in (1.1) or as in (A.1),
the optimal action of agent i will be given by 
ai
* =E[ra+(1–r)θ|y, xi],
i’s estimate of a weighted average of the fundamental state θ and the
average action of others a. (Here E[.|.] is the conditional expectation
operator, averaging over possible realizations of θ and the random
signals.) Thus, a higher value of r implies a greater tendency to choose
an action similar to what one guesses that others are doing (greater
strategic complementarity). 
Under the assumption of prior beliefs about θ given by an improper
uniform prior on the real line, an agent’s optimal estimate of the funda-
mental state after observing both private and public signals will be 
E[θ|y, xi]= y+ xi,
a weighted average of the two signals with weights that depend on the
relative precisions of the signals. One can then show that the equilib-
rium action of each market participant will be given by 
a* i =                     . (A.2) 
Expression (A.2) shows how the weight that market participants put
on their private information decreases as a result of an increase in the
precision α of the public signal. 
Morris and Shin measure social welfare by the negative of the social
loss function 
L










α + βwhich is easily seen to correspond to the expression (1.2) in the text.
It then follows from the description (A.2) of equilibrium behavior that 
Λ
MS ≡ E [L
soc,MS|θ] =                     . (A.3)
The key result of Morris and Shin is that the function on the right-
hand side of (A.3) is not necessarily decreasing in α, for given values of
β and r. In particular, one can show that ∂Λ
MS/∂α > 0 if and only if 
β < (1−r)(2r–1). (A.4) 
Since the right-hand side of (A.4) is positive for all 1⁄2 < r < 1, there exist
parameter configurations that satisfy (A.4). Hence, it is possible to
construct examples in which a (small enough) increase in the precision
of the public signal would increase expected social losses, under the
Morris-Shin measure. As noted in the text, however, condition (A.4) is
fairly stringent. Svensson (2005) points out that the right-hand side of
(A.4) is no greater than one-eighth for any value of r, hence, the perverse
case cannot arise unless α < β/8. Moreover, the right-hand side is only
positive if r> 1⁄2, so the perverse case does not arise, even when αis much
smaller than β, unless r > 1⁄2, so that the weight on the conformity-with-
others objective in market participants’ preferences is greater than the
weight on the conformity-with-fundamentals objective. 
The possibility of a perverse case also depends on the (completely
unmotivated) inclusion of the final term in the individual loss func-
tion (A.1). Suppose that one instead represents individual preferences
by the loss function (1.1) proposed in the text and uses as a social loss




Equilibrium actions are again given by (A.2), but the implied
expected level of social losses is now 





αΛ ≡ E [L
soc|θ]= . (A.5)
The right-hand side of (A.5) easily is seen to be a globally decreasing
function of α, for any values of β and r. Thus, in this case, the release
of a more precise estimate by the public authority necessarily will
improve social welfare, regardless of how imprecise the estimate may
be that it is possible for the authority to release and of how great may
be the concern of market participants to behave as others do. 
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1Even William Poole, in the remarks just cited, refrains from taking a stand on
this last issue.
2Gurkaynak (2005) finds that what he calls “timing surprises”—unexpected
changes in the current federal funds rate operating target that do not involve any
change in market expectations regarding what the funds rate target will be after the
next meeting, as when a change in the target that already was expected occurs
sooner than some had expected it—have little effect on either bond yields or equity
prices. The FOMC post-meeting statements that change expectations regarding the
future path of the funds rate have significant effects on both.
3There is evidence this is happening already, as a result both of greater sophisti-
cation on the part of financial markets and greater transparency on the part of
central banks, the two developing in a sort of symbiosis with one another. Blinder
and others (2001, p. 8) argue that in the period from early 1996 through the
middle of 1999, one could observe the U.S. bond market moving in response to
macroeconomic developments. This helped to stabilize the economy, despite rela-
tively little change in the level of the federal funds rate, and suggests that this
reflected an improvement in the bond market’s ability to forecast Fed actions before
they occur. Statistical evidence of increased forecastability of Fed policy by the
markets is provided by Lange and others (2001), who show that the ability of Trea-
sury bill yields to predict changes in the federal funds rate some months in advance
has increased since the late 1980s.
4King (2005b) proposes that it is more reasonable to expect the public to follow
simple (but possibly fairly robust) “heuristics” in making decisions, of the kind
discussed by Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), rather than behaving like the optimizing
agents of economic theory. He argues that in this case central bank communication
can play an important role in leading people to choose heuristics of the right sort—
in other words, ones that lead to greater macroeconomic stability.
5Eusepi (2005) finds in the context of a model with more detailed microfounda-
tions that requiring private agents to learn equilibrium patterns of fluctuations in
inflation and the output gap by estimating atheoretical regressions can lead to insta-
bility of the learning dynamics and to persistent fluctuations driven by learning
dynamics; transparency about the form of the central bank’s policy rule (so agents
can estimate a correctly specified structural equation instead of a reduced-form
econometric model) instead favors stability of the learning dynamics.
6Note, however, some qualifications to this in the “Can a central bank talk too
much?” section.
Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness 461
 7The point here is that while any one “special” situation with which the rule does
not deal might be highly unlikely ex ante, the central bank likely would face some
such situation quite often, as the number of possible “special” situations is so large.
8Charles Goodhart also has stressed (in private communication) that a monetary
policy committee’s views inevitably will change over time with changes in the
composition of the committee.
9It also should allow policy to be history-dependent in a way that discretionary
optimization is not. This is discussed further below.
10I discuss recent policy signaling by the Fed in the second section of the paper. On
recent policy signaling by the Bank of Japan, see Bernanke and others (2004); Fujiki
and Shiratsuka (2002); Iwamura and others (2004); and Oda and Ueda (2005).
11In optimal policy calculations, like the ones discussed in the next section, the
history dependence of optimal policy results from the presence of lagged Lagrange
multipliers in the first-order conditions that characterize the optimal state-contingent
evolution of the economy. The lagged values of these Lagrange multipliers depend on
the decision problem faced by the central bank at its last decision point. For further
discussion, see Woodford (2003, chap. 7) and Svensson and Woodford (2005).
12Demiralp and Jorda (2002) find that it has been possible for the Fed to move the
funds rate with a smaller quantity of open market operations since 1994 than before,
and interpret this as an effect of the FOMC’s greater transparency about its funds
rate target since 1994. This would suggest that advance signaling of what the Fed
wishes to achieve makes it easier for it to move interest rates where it wishes them to
be, contrary to the argument mentioned in the previous paragraph. There is a simple
reason why this is likely to be the case, namely, intertemporal substitution in the
demand for federal funds as a result of the fact that reserve requirements demand
only a certain average level of reserves over a two-week maintenance period.
13I develop this point in more detail in Woodford (2001), where a simple model
of policy effectiveness with incomplete market participation is presented.
14The decision to release more information is represented in the Morris-Shin
model by the release of a signal that is a less noisy measure of the fundamental state.
Their conclusion that under some circumstances it may be better for a central bank
to say less is, in fact, a finding that under certain circumstances it would increase
social welfare for the central bank to release estimates of the state of the economy
that contain more random noise. Stating the conclusion this way would make it seem
more paradoxical, but this is actually what their formal analysis implies.
15The application of the Morris-Shin insight about the issue of the desirable
amount of central bank communication is developed especially in Amato, Morris,
and Shin (2002) and Amato and Shin (2003).
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 16See, for example, the discussion in The Economist (2004) and by Kohn (2005)
and Issing (2005).
17The minimum required ratio depends on the parameter r of the loss function
(1.1) below, but it is always eight or higher; see the Appendix for details.
18Gov. Kohn (2005) suggests that the danger identified by Morris and Shin
applies even more in the case of communication about the “policy inclination” than
communication about the economic outlook because markets are especially likely
to pay great attention to what a central bank says about future policy. But in the
model of Morris and Shin, market participants put greater weight on the public
signal, the greater the expected relative precision of that signal (in other words, the
greater the extent to which the public authority is believed to be relatively better
informed). But the more this is true, the stronger will be the relative strength of the
desirable effect of increased transparency.
19Roca (2005) obtains a similar result in the case of a model of price setting under
monopolistic competition of the kind discussed by Amato and Shin (2003), when
a welfare objective is used that is based on the preferences of the households in the
model. Hellwig (2004) similarly finds that transparency is welfare-increasing in an
explicit model of complementarities in price setting, while Angeletos and Pavan
(2004) obtain a similar conclusion in a model of complementarities in investment.
20In the model of Morris and Shin, no individual is harmed by her observation
of the public signal; if she were, she could choose to ignore it. Each market partic-
ipant conditions her action on the public signal to precisely the extent that
minimizes her expected losses, taking into account the likely error in the available
sources of information.
21This analysis extends the discussion of Krugman (1998) to include a more
developed treatment of the dynamics of price adjustment, the connection between
interest rate policy and the generation of inflationary expectations, and the conse-
quences of alternative forms of open market operations.
22Equation (2.1) is here written without the “cost-push shock” term that plays a
central role in the analysis of optimal policy in Clarida and others. The issue with
which we are here concerned (the possible difficulties for policy created by the zero
bound) is not one for which the existence of a “cost-push” term is important,
whereas the existence of fluctuations in the natural rate of interest rn
t is instead 
critical. The optimal policy rule derived by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),
however, is also optimal in the presence of “cost-push shocks” of the kind hypothe-
sized by Clarida and others.
23This is Krugman’s 1998 analysis of the situation of the Japanese economy since
the mid-1990s. See also Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for discussion of some of the
kinds of real factors that can shift the natural rate of interest.
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 24Here, I restrict attention to the Markovian (minimum-state-variable) equilib-
rium consistent with the hypothesized policy. Note that when this equilibrium
exists, it represents at least one possible outcome, and the fact that it may be very
bad indicates the problem with this approach to policy.
25Of course, for a large enough rate of deflation and departure from the natural
rate of output, the local approximations in (2.1) – (2.2) cease to be accurate, but
this suffices to show that the departures from the zero inflation steady state need
not be small, for if they were small, the local approximations would be valid, and
equation (2.9) would be approximately correct.
26Equation (2.10) applies as long as π ≤ −r, so that the zero bound continues to
bind when rn
t = r. 
27Jung and others (2005) reach a similar conclusion in the case of different
assumed dynamics for the natural rate of interest. Adam and Billi (2003) character-
ize optimal policy in the same model in the case of continuing stochastic fluctuations
in the natural rate that cause the zero bound to bind periodically.
28These effects are quite strong because it is assumed in the example that there is
only a 10 percent chance each quarter that fundamentals will revert to the normal
state. Thus, at any point in time while the natural rate of interest is negative, it is
expected that this situation is likely to persist for two or more additional years.
29The analysis similarly can be generalized to the case of an objective function in
which the optimal inflation rate is assumed to be some positive inflation rate π*,
rather than zero. In this case, history-dependent policy is needed only if the natural
rate of interest sometimes falls below the level il – π*.
30Concern about the effectiveness of its communication strategy also was indi-
cated by the fact that the committee scheduled a meeting for September, prior to
the next policy decision, to reconsider “its practices regarding the communication
of its policy decisions and its assessment of the risks to its objectives.”
31The dates on which statements have been released containing various types of
language regarding likely future policy are indicated in Chart 2 by the codes “C,”
“P,” and “M.” The code “C” indicates a reference to maintaining accommodation
for a “considerable period.”
32The commitment to keep rates low “for a considerable period” already had been
qualified in the December 2003 statement, by the inclusion of a reference tying this
policy to continued low inflation and resource “slack.”
33There is no indication in the minutes that the FOMC did not believe that inter-
est rates could ever be cut below 1 percent. But for whatever reason, no further cut
in the funds rate target was made, despite the desire to head off further disinflation
and to signal to the markets that policy would not be tightened as much as was
464 Michael Woodfordwidely believed. In discussing policy in the summer of 2003, Gov. Donald Kohn
speaks of a funds rate target of zero as having “uncertain consequences,” and says that
signaling about future policy instead “seemed to be the less-risky way” to stimulate
demand (Kohn, 2005). This suggests that there was indeed a reluctance to cut the
funds rate target, at least given the existence of an alternative lever of policy.
34Discussing the same period, Gov. Kohn (2005) states “I would judge the
outcome to have been successful. We did influence rates to better reflect the actual
path of policy,” with a good outcome for the economy as well.
35The surprise components are measured by observing the change in federal
funds futures prices for the following month that occurs over a one-hour time
window around the announcement. The data on policy surprises are taken from
Table 2 of the data appendix to Gurkaynak and others (2005), available on the
International Journal of Central Banking (IJCB) Web site.
36The values plotted for the slope surprises in Chart 3 are 10 times as large as the
definition used by Gurkaynak to make the variations more visible in the figure.
37Between January 1998 and June 2003, the root-mean-square (r.m.s.) size of the
slope surprise (under the normalization used in Chart 3) was 0.53, while between
January 2001 and June 2003 (shown in the chart), it was closer to 0.54. Between
August 2003 and December 2004 (the last FOMC statement in Gurkaynak’s sample),
the r.m.s. size has been 0.33—a reduction in volatility, but only a modest one.
38In a related analysis, Gurkaynak and others (2005) decompose changes in the
term structure of interest rates upon the release of an FOMC statement into two
(orthogonalized) principal components. They interpret the factor that is constructed
to be uncorrelated with “policy surprises” as measure of changes in the expected future
path of interest rates independent of any change in the current policy rate. As their
chart indicates, the volatility of this “path factor” also has remained as large since
August 2003 as it had been before.
39The observation that funds rate decisions are no longer surprises on the day of
the meeting under the new regime contrasts with the findings of Ehrmann and
Fratzscher (2005) about the effects of the Fed’s change in disclosure policy in 1999.
They find that funds rate decisions were not any more predictable on the day of the
meeting under the regime where the FOMC released a “balance of risks” statement
than they had been previously, though they do find that the increased communica-
tion after 1999 did have the effect of increasing the degree to which funds rate
decisions already could be forecasted by the markets immediately following the
previous FOMC meeting (so that less learning occurred during intermeeting
periods under the new regime), and also that FOMC meetings contributed less to
financial market volatility under the new regime. Thus, while the post-1999
“balance of risk” statements did increase the forecastability of policy (albeit not at
Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness 465
 such short horizons as a day in advance), the new policy signaling regime appears
to be even more effective at this.
40For example, the minutes for the May 2004 meeting, at which the “measured
pace” language was introduced, reports that “a number of policymakers were
concerned that such an assertion could unduly constrain future adjustments to the
stance of policy should the evidence emerging in coming months suggest that an
appreciable firming would be appropriate,” though all members eventually endorsed
the language adopted.
41Other approaches to the implementation of the optimal state-contingent policy in
a similar model are discussed by Svensson (2004) and by Sugo and Teranishi (2005).
42This variable is equal to the log price level plus a positive multiple of the output
gap. Thus, the price level target automatically is increased slightly in the event of a
negative output gap.
43Bernanke and others (2004) note that during the period of the FOMC’s
commitment to keep rates low for a “considerable period,” each FOMC statement
also discussed labor market conditions, which might have been interpreted as indi-
cating that a change in the policy would be conditional upon labor market
developments. As evidence in support of the conditionality have been understood
by market participants, they find that Treasury yields became more responsive to
news in the monthly payroll number in the employment report during this period.
44Gov. Kohn (2005) lists as an important reason for the earlier release of the
minutes the desire to “help spell out the linkage the committee may see between
any policy inclination and its economic outlook” and “convey the conditionality of
committee thinking.”
45Before 2004, the criterion required the projection of a different inflation
measure, RPIX inflation, to equal 2.5 percent at the eight-quarter horizon (Vickers,
1998;Goodhart, 2001). The change in target criterion is discussed in Bank of
England (2004a).
46Former Bank of England MPC member Charles Goodhart (2001) describes
himself as having tried to set interest rates in this way, and says “This was, I
thought, what the exercise was supposed to be” (p. 177). Jansson and Vredin (2003)
describe the similar procedure used by the Sveriges Riksbank.
47Goodhart (2001) reviews what he calls “the prima facie case against” this
approach before offering his defense of it. Other critical discussions include Leitemo
(2003), Svensson (2003), and Honkapohja and Mitra (2003).
48See Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for further discussion.
466 Michael Woodford
 49Leitemo (2003) discusses possible interpretations of the constant interest rate
projection exercise that would allow it to yield a policy recommendation even in the
case of a forward-looking model of the transmission mechanism, but these do not
eliminate the other unappealing features of such a procedure.
50See Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Preston (2005) for analyses of forward-
looking models with least-squares learning by the private sector.
51Goodhart (2005) indicates that “in medium run simulations at the Bank of
England running much beyond [a] two-year horizon, the constant two-year rate
assumption had to be linked into a Taylor-type reaction function to prevent
nonsensical trends from developing as the horizon extended beyond two years” (p.
7). Goodhart argues that this does not present any problem for an exercise in which
the constant-rate assumption is maintained only over a two-year horizon. But if one
admits the acceptability of imposing a reaction function as the policy assumption
beyond the two-year horizon, it is unclear why one should not be willing to impose
a reaction function for earlier dates as well, at least to the extent that the MPC is
not willing to take a stand on a particular direction of likely near-term deviation
from the “typical” reaction function.
52Even before the Bank of England ceased to use the constant interest rate projec-
tions as the base case in its Inflation Report, it was fairly clear that these projections
did not represent the bank’s own forecast of how the economy was most likely to
evolve. This was conceded at least implicitly in the bank’s published discussions of
the accuracy of its projections, for example in the Inflation Reports of August 2001
and August 2002. In these discussions, the bank gave exclusive attention to the
projections that it also published in which an interest rate path was assumed corre-
sponding to current market expectations, rather than to the projections conditional
on the constant interest rate path. If the bank regarded the constant interest rate
assumption as the best available forecast of its behavior, it would want to test the
accuracy of the projections made under that assumption, rather than under
contrary assumptions that might be made by traders in financial markets.
53In the case of the February 2004 projections of the Bank of England already
discussed above, the constant interest rate projection used as the main basis for
policy deliberations at the time indicated inflation near 2 percent at the eight-quarter
horizon, but surging above 2 percent over the next year. As shown in the bank’s
subsequent discussion of its decision to de-emphasize the constant interest rate
projections (Bank of England, 2004b, pp. 42-43), a projection based on market
anticipations regarding the future path of interest rates (according to which interest
rates would soon be raised above the 4 percent decided upon in February) instead
implied that inflation should remain well below 2 percent over the entire two-year
period, though this projection would imply an inflation rate nearing 2 percent if
extended three years into the future. If the latter projection were really the one
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 regarded as more realistic by the MPC in February, this would imply that it was not
really basing its decision on projected inflation at the eight-quarter horizon.
54The minutes of the monthly MPC meetings in 2004 indicate considerable
emphasis on the projections based on market expectations, as opposed to the
constant interest rate projections, in the actual policy decisions from at least March
2004 onward. The August Inflation Report was the first one to recognize this change
in the MPC’s thinking by presenting the market-expectations projections as the
base case.
55The Sveriges Riksbank also has begun, in its 2005:Q1 Inflation Report, to give
more prominence to projections conditional on an interest rate path inferred from
the term structure. However, the Riksbank continues to base its “main scenario” on
the assumption that the repo rate will remain unchanged. The alternative scenario
also is presented, late in the report, to “provide a broader base for discussions of
monetary policy” (Sveriges Riksbank, 2005, p. 5), but is not referred to in the main
discussion of inflation risks under current policy. The Inflation Reports of Norges
Bank currently give greatest prominence to a baseline scenario in which the interest-
rate assumption is described as “based on market interest rate expectations” (see, for
example, Norges Bank, 2005, p. 2), but which seems actually to represent a view of
the bank itself as to the most likely path of interest rates, as discussed further below.
56The explanation of the interest rate assumption includes the following qualifi-
cation: “It is important to stress that the market rate path does not represent the
MPC’s forecast of official interest rates…. Financial markets may judge economic
prospects differently from the MPC,” Bank of England (2004b, p. 41).
57See Table 6.A, “Market expectations of the Bank’s official interest rate,” in each
of these issues of the Inflation Report.
58See also Goodhart (2005) for criticism of the new procedure.
59Here, I am interpreting a projection based on “market expectations” as one that
computes a particular forward path for interest rates from the term structure, and
then substitutes that interest rate path into the structural model as the specification
of monetary policy. One could imagine carrying out such an exercise in other
ways—in the next section, I discuss an alternative—and it is not clear from
published discussions exactly what kind of computations are undertaken by the
Bank of England staff. But the interpretation discussed here is not only the simplest
version of such an exercise. It is the only version that would allow a central bank to
avoid making any assumptions of its own about how it will conduct policy in the
future. Thus, even if it is not the kind of projection exercise currently used at the
Bank of England, it is a type of exercise that might well be attempted by a central
bank seeking to follow its lead in using projections based on market expectations.
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 60In particular, it is unrelated to the real factors that cause variation in either the
natural rate of output or the natural rate of interest.
61Substitution of the interest rate path {it+j|t} expected by the markets into the
model consisting of equations (2.1) – (2.2) would not yield this as the only possi-
ble equilibrium because of the indeterminacy problem already referred to in the
case of any exogenously specified interest rate path. But it would be one possible
projection consistent with both the model and with market expectations regarding
the path of interest rates; and since it is the correct forecast, in the conjectured equi-
librium, I shall suppose that the central bank is sophisticated enough to produce
this forecast.
62For simplicity, I here assume that the target inflation rate is zero. This allows me
to avoid discussing the question whether it makes sense to suppose, as in the Calvo
pricing model used here, that prices should remain fixed in nominal terms between
the occasions on which they are re-optimized, even when the central bank’s target rate
of inflation is positive and inflation is positive on average. The point made here about
the possibility of sunspot equilibria in which inflation reverts quickly to the target
level would be equally valid if the target rate of inflation were assumed to be positive.
63For example, in the case that ρ=0.7 and periods represent quarters, one could
have an equilibrium in which actual inflation varies over a range as wide as 6
percentage points (three points above and below the target), solely as a result of self-
fulfilling expectations, but in which projected inflation eight quarters in the future
would never be more than 10 basis points away from the target.
64The problem just described arises because of the use of a target criterion that
involves only the economy’s projected state eight quarters and more in the future.
It could be eliminated by the use of a nearer-term target criterion. This would be
desirable on other grounds as well, as discussed in Woodford (2004).
65The models used at some other banks, such as the Bank of Canada, similarly
include equations intended to represent future policy, but these banks do not
publish their projections. Norges Bank is another inflation-forecast-targeting
central bank that recently has begun to publish projections based on a nonconstant
interest rate path that appears to represent the bank’s own view of the most likely
scenario, though it is unclear how this path is determined. The interest rate assump-
tion is described as “based on market interest rate expectations,” and the interest
rate path assumed in the baseline scenario typically coincides with the path implied
by forward rates for the first several quarters, though it may deviate from market
expectations in later quarters if the bank disagrees with the apparent expectations
of the markets, Norges Bank (2005, Chart 3.2).
66The members of the monetary policy committee might wish, under certain
circumstances, to modify the model's default rule for the future conduct of policy
because the committee does not regard it as correctly representing its intentions
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 regarding near-term future policy. But this would only occur to the extent that it
was, in fact, possible for it to agree that current conditions would justify a depar-
ture from typical policy, as in the case of the recent response to the perceived threat
of deflation in the United States, discussed above.
67See also Goodhart (2005, p. 6).
68See, for example, Chart 6.1 in Bank of England (2004b, p. 41); the quotation
in the text is from the same page.
69In the case of a purely backward-looking model of the transmission mechanism,
the alternative procedure would lead to an identical outcome and only would be
more cumbersome computationally.
70Morris and Shin write integrals for this operator.
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